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THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE AIDING AND




[Iln substance the growth of the law is legislative. . . . The
very considerations which judges most rarely mention,
and always with an apology, are the secret root from
which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of
course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned. Every important principle which is
developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result
of more or less definitely understood views of public
policy.'
The courts have long played an interstitial role in our
system of government. The principles by which we are
governed do not spring forth fully formed; instead, they are
derived through careful analysis of fact, reasoned deliberation
about the common good, judicious application of multiple
bodies of law, and trial and error.2 The evolution of law
governing domestic remedies for torts in violation of
customary international law is an illustrative example.' This
* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2011; Cornell University,
A.B. 2006. I would like to thank Jonathan Bush, William Casto, Christopher
Ford, Mark Irvine, Chimhne Keitner, Leigh Llewelyn, Almira Moronne,
Michelle Phillips, David Riesenberg, Matthew Smith, Kate Supnik and Ernest
Young for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this Article.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881).
2. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953) ("Federal law is generally interstitial in
nature.").
3. William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for
Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 639 (2006) ("Under this
traditional dichotomy [between rights and remedies], the norm that is enforced
in ATS litigation comes from international law and therefore is to a significant
degree beyond the federal courts' lawmaking powers.... Sosa's pronouncement
that the federal courts have discretion to create or deny a cause of action relates
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much is clear: when Congress passed the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,4 it established a
federal forum where foreigners could bring forth grievances
stemming from violations against the law of nations.' At the
time of enactment, the ATS "enabled federal courts to hear
claims in a very limited category."' Today, as a result of the
growth of customary international law, the ATS furnishes a
larger set of domestic remedies, though the precise number is
hotly contested.' The crux of the debate is thus over the role
of the judiciary in crafting the gap-filling measures required
to make the statute function as it was envisioned in 1789.
What norms of customary international law provide domestic
remedies under federal common law? How entrenched must
an international norm be in order for the ATS to offer a
remedy? What effect has Erie had on the statute?8  Sosa v.
Alvarez Machain,9 the only significant pronouncement by the
Supreme Court to date on the ATS, was supposed to address
these preliminary questions. Yet it offered no clear answers.
This Article does not aim to add to the voluminous debate
between supporters and detractors of the ATS, nor does it aim
to the remedy rather than the norm.").
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
5. Id. Customary international law (CIL) and the law of nations are used
interchangeably throughout this Article.
6. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
7. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) ("[T]he number of torts that violate the law of nations has increased, and
Congress has erected no barrier to their recognition under the [ATS]."); Curtis
A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV.
869, 895 (2007) ("N]either Erie nor Congress ha[s] categorically prohibited the
judicial recognition of claims under CIL.").
8. In Sosa, the Court held that "Erie did not in terms bar any judicial
recognition of new substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and
post-Erie understanding has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts
may derive some substantive law in a common law way... . We think it would
be unreasonable to assume that the First Congress would have expected federal
courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply
because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to
modern realism." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-30 (citations and footnotes omitted).
See also Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 623-55
(2008); William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of
Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007). But see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 744-46
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
9. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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to resolve the incorporation debate. Instead, it offers
something simpler yet more essential: a roadmap for the
Court to follow in answering the most pressing issues. Are
corporations liable under the ATS? Does corporate liability
under the ATS conflict with international law? What body of
substantive law should courts apply, especially when
adjudicating alien tort claims arising under the aiding and
abetting theory of liability? Finally, what are the policy
implications of ATS litigation? The Sosa Court relegated
most of these concerns to a cryptic footnote and otherwise left
them unanswered.' 0 Taken together, these questions help
identify the limits imposed by customary international law
and by Sosa on the federal courts regarding corporate aiding
and abetting liability.
Recent developments have made these questions
especially timely. On September 10, 2009, the Second Circuit
requested briefing on the subject of corporate liability under
the ATS." Less than a month later, in Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the Second Circuit held
that according to international law the "mens rea standard for
aiding and abetting liability in ATS actions is purpose rather
than knowledge alone."" International law scholars
vehemently denounced this decision and the Supreme Court
was widely expected to address the issue before the
Presbyterian Church of Sudan filed for certiorari.'" That is
10. Id. at 732 n.20 ("A related consideration is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator
being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual. Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 791-795
(CADC 1984) [sic] (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient consensus in 1984 that
torture by private actors violates international law), with Kadic v. Karadlid, 70
F. 3d 232, 239-241 (CA2 1995) [sic] (sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide
by private actors violates international law).").
11. Order Requesting Briefing, Balintulo v. Daimler AG, No. 09-2778-cv (2d
Cir. Sept. 10, 2009). Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit ordered supplemental
briefing on the same issue. Order Requesting Supplemental Briefing, Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, 09-56381-cv (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2009). An en banc panel heard
arguments on September 21, 2010. Meanwhile, the Second Circuit has ruled on
the issue. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010
WL 3611392, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010).
12. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
259 (2d Cir. 2009).
13. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Talisman Energy-Amateur Hour at the
International Law Improv, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 6, 2009, 9:25 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2009/10/06/talisman-energy-amateur-hour-at-the-
international-law-improv/; John Ruggie, Remarks for ICJ Access to Justice
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because on November 2, 2009, the Supreme Court invited the
Solicitor General to submit a brief in Pfizer, Inc. v.
Abdullahi.14 Had the Court taken up this case, it would have
confronted all four questions addressed in this Article.
Underpinning the system of judicial lawmaking is the
effective resolution of these kinds of questions by the highest
court. On June 29, 2010, however, following the advice of the
Solicitor General, the Court denied certiorari and missed a
prime opportunity to clarify the law.' 5  Recent developments
in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy
underscore that the questions raised in Pfizer will persist
until resolved by the Court.'6
On April 15, 2010, Presbyterian Church of Sudan filed a
petition for certiorari, challenging the Second Circuit's mens
rea standard for aiding and abetting under the ATS.'"
Talisman Energy responded by filing a conditional cross-
petition for certiorari on the issues of corporate liability and
extraterritoriality." Thus, the Court was again confronted
with all four questions that make up this Article's inquiry."
Unfortunately, the literature has so far approached these
issues in a manner that is confused, piecemeal, and often
wrong. These questions cannot be viewed separately. A
holistic approach to the ATS is needed to serve as a
springboard for a deeper inquiry into the relationship
between international legal norms and the federal common
law.
Workshop, available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-remarks-
ICJ-Access-to-Justice-workshop-Johannesburg-29-30-Oct-2009.pdf ("Adoption of
such a standard goes against the weight of international legal opinion, as
outlined in my 2008 report to the UN Human Rights Council on corporate
complicity as well as in the ICJs work on this issue.").
14. Docket Entry, Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, et al., No. 09-34 (November 2,
2009), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docke
tfiles/09-34.htm (inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief in this case
expressing the views of the United States).
15. Id.
16. Docket Entry, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, No.
09-1262 (April 15, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/09-1262.htm (petitioning for certiorari).
17. Id.
18. Docket Entry, Talisman Energy v. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, No.
09-1418, (May 20, 2010), available at httpJ/www.supremecourt.gov/
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/09-1418.htm (filing a conditional cross-
petition for certiorari).
19. On October 4, 2010, the Court denied certiorari to both petitions.
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the
complicated history of the ATS and explains why the Court
must revisit many of the issues in Sosa. Part II examines
corporate liability under the law of nations and argues that
corporations may be liable under the ATS. Part III explains
how the ATS is jurisdictionally compatible with international
law. Part IV offers a corrective to the common choice of law
mistakes made during ATS adjudication. Part V argues that
Pfizer v. Abdullahi was a missed opportunity to clarify
corporate aiding and abetting liability under the ATS. Part
VI delves into the certiorari briefs submitted in Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy. Finally, Part VII
shows why concern over the alleged harms of ATS litigation is
vastly exaggerated.
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
A. Origins
Much of the confusion surrounding the ATS is the result
of the statute's unique history. Although legislative history is
scarce, it appears that this law was in no small measure a
response to the Marbois Affair. In May 1784, the French
Consul General to the United States, Frangois Barb&
Marbois, was assaulted by a fellow Frenchman on the streets
of Philadelphia.2 0 The assailant was tried and convicted in a
Pennsylvania court for violating the law of nations.2 1 "This
law," Chief Justice M'Kean affirmed, "in its full extent, is part
of the law of this State."22 Indeed, customary international
law had always been part of common law. 23
The Continental Congress had previously issued a non-
20. Respublica v. De Longehamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 111-12 (1784).
21. Id. at 111.
22. Id. at 116. As courts of general jurisdiction, state courts have always
been open to hear these types of claims.
23. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *67
(noting that the law of nations is "adopted in it's [sic] full extent by the common
law, and is held to be part of the law of the land"); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) ("When the United States declared their independence,
they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and
refinement"); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 27 (1792) ("The law of nations, although not
specifically adopted by the Constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a
part of the law of the land"). See also 1 James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, in
THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 128, 128-58 (James DeWitt Andrews ed.,
Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896).
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binding resolution calling on states to "provide expeditious,
exemplary, and adequate punishment" for infractions of
international law,2 4 but the Marbois Affair underscored the
dangers in leaving sensitive diplomatic matters to the
states.2 5  As the Court has since recognized, "rules of
international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps
parochial state interpretations."26 When Congress passed the
Judiciary Act of 1789, it created "no new causes of action," but
merely established a federal forum where foreigners could
bring grievances for violations of the law of nations. 7
B. Rebirth
Prior to Fildrtiga v. Peha-Irala," federal courts had
adjudicated only two cases under the ATS.2 9 Filirtiga opened
the door for international human rights litigation in U.S.
courts.o Yet even as the lower courts have struggled to
interpret this ancient statute, the Supreme Court has been
reluctant to intercede. To date, its only significant
pronouncement is Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,3 a cautious
decision that has produced multiple interpretations and little
consensus on fundamental questions. In the words of one
24. 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1136 (Gaillard Hunt eds.,
Washington Gov't Printing Office, 1912) (referring specifically to "the violation
of safe conducts or passports, . . . of hostility against such as are in amity,...
infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and other public ministers").
25. The Founders also addressed the Marbois Affair through the
Constitution's define and punish clause and the 1790 Crimes Act. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 10; Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112. This and other episodes
contributing to the genesis of the ATS suggest the statute was designed to
eliminate friction with other states. Yet the language of the statute also
suggests that the Founders intended to make remedies for violations of the law
of nations broadly available to all aliens. Courts must balance these two
competing values.
26. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). See
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay).
27. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). The Alien Tort
Statute "was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of
the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject." Id. at 714.
28. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3
F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
30. In Fildrtiga, the Second Circuit held the defendant liable under the ATS
for torture committed abroad. 630 F.2d at 878.
31. The Court held "that a single illegal detention of less than a day,
followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as
to support the creation of a federal remedy." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738.
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noted scholar, "Justice Souter's majority opinion in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain has become something of a Rorschach blot,
in which each of the contending sides . . . sees what it was
predisposed to see anyway." 2 Yet even this pithy observation
fails to capture the variety of interpretations spawned by
Sosa. For example, Judge William Fletcher endorsed the
Revisionist 33 historical account in full, but nevertheless
concluded that Sosa "implies that the federal common law of
customary international law is jurisdiction-conferring." 3 4
These debates affect our inquiry into corporate aiding and
abetting liability only insofar as they obscure two important
standards set up by the Court. That Sosa endorsed a system
of judicial lawmaking is undeniable. Yet in order to ascertain
the purpose of this system and the breadth of judicial
discretion granted to the lower courts, these standards must
be clarified.
The first standard concerns jurisprudential limits on the
ability of the courts to recognize new remedies based on
customary international law. The Revisionists contend that
to accommodate the ATS in a post-Erie world, the Court
adopted an improper construction of the statute authorizing
the judicial creation of domestic remedies.3 ' Essentially, they
argue that the Court attempted to "translate" the First
Congress's "expectations about the effect of the ATS, which
rested on a pre-Erie understanding of general common law,
into the contemporary context in which federal courts apply
nonstate common law only in specialized circumstances."36
They then point to a "tension, if not outright contradiction, in
the Court's construction of the ATS as both purely
jurisdictional and an authorization for creating causes of
action."3 Other scholars have charged that "this tension is of
[the Revisionists'] own making and vanishes once one accepts,
32. Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International
Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 28, 28 (2007).
33. See Bradley et al., supra note 7, at 886 ("[The revisionist view was that
CIL does not automatically have the status of federal common law and that
after Erie, federal courts needed some authorization from either the political
branches or the Constitution in order to apply CIL.").
34. Compare William A. Fletcher, Lecture, International Human Rights in
American Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 653, 665 (2007), with Bradley et al., supra note
7, at 902.
35. Bradley et al., supra note 7, at 895.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 896.
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as the Sosa Court did, that congressional authorization is
unnecessary because customary international law is already
part of the U.S. legal system."38  These other scholars
interpret Sosa to mean that "Erie and other changes in
domestic and international law are prudential
considerations-'reasons . . . for caution'-not requirements
that may override the original understanding."" In contrast,
the Revisionists consider the common lawmaking powers of
the courts constrained by Congress's original intent to furnish
jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions and by what
they construe as a three-pronged Erie test.4 0 The other
scholars point out that this interpretation is plainly
contradicted by the language of the decision. The Court held
that lower courts possess "a substantial element of
discretionary judgment" and that "judicial power should be
exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar
subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow
class of international norms today."41 Nor is it reasonable to
infer that Justice Souter's passing mention of "a series of
reasons [that] argue for judicial caution" amounts to a test-
rather than a list of prudential considerations.4 2 Whichever
interpretation ultimately prevails, it remains the case that
under the Sosa system, the lower courts possess substantial
powers to recognize domestic remedies for violations of
international law.
The second standard concerns the violations of customary
international law that can be brought before a federal court
under the ATS.4 3 In Sosa, the Court held that the cause of
38. Dodge, supra note 8, at 21.
39. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004)).
40. Bradley et al., supra note 7, at 878-81. The Revisionists claim federal
common law must 1) have some federal law basis; 2) fill in the gaps of federal
statutory or constitutional regimes; and 3) reflect the policy choices of existing
federal law. Id. The Second Circuit has rejected this reading of Sosa. See
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268 (2d Cir. 2007) (Judge
Katzmann did "not read Sosa as requiring that a court individually analyze
each of the five reasons."). Souter listed five, rather than three, reasons for
caution. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-728.
41. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726, 729.
42. Id. at 725.
43. Under the ATS not all customary international law is actionable.
Certain norms are not sufficiently entrenched to support an alien tort claim.
See, e.g., Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir.
2005) (following Sosa in holding that the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights did not "create obligations enforceable in the federal courts");
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action must "rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the eighteenth century
paradigms we have recognized."" The meaning of this
standard has also engendered disagreement. Revisionists
contend that the test is stricter than those previously
employed by the lower courts. 4 5 This does not comport with
evidence presented by Professor Beth Stephens that the
requirements of "clear definition" and "general assent of
civilized nations" were first employed in Fildrtiga.4 Casting
further doubt on the Revisionist interpretation, Professor
William S. Dodge has demonstrated that this second
requirement simply defines customary international law. 47
Both elements of this standard appear to be the product of
judicial prudence rather than substantive constraints. The
rationale behind this judge-made rule is that the "general
practice has been to look for legislative guidance before
exercising innovative authority over substantive law."48
Customary international law, however, provides "judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for adjudicating suits
brought under the Alien Tort Act, which obviates any need to
make initial policy decisions of the kind normally reserved for
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S.
Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2283 (2004) (criticizing Sosa for returning "to a
conception of the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] that is anachronistic
by several decades, inconsistent with the Court's precedent, and contrary to the
favorable invocation in Fildrtiga, which had considered the Declaration
authoritative if non-binding evidence of a widely accepted norm.").
44. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25.
45. Bradley et al., supra note 7, at 897.
46. Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: "The Door is Still Ajar" For
Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 551 (2004).
This cautious approach mirrors that applied by most of the lower courts
considering ATS claims before Sosa. The Court recognized this, citing
with approval the key lower court decisions defining the reach of the
ATS. Fildrtiga held that an actionable norm under the ATS must
"command the 'general assent of civilized nations'" and be capable of
"clear and unambiguous" definition.
Id.
47. William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the
U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
87, 99 (2004) (adding "it is not clear whether these modern developments impose
additional limitations on the ATS or simply reinforce its inherent limitations").
48. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
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nonjudicial discretion."" International norms provide a built-
in rationale for applying certain substantive law, rebutting
the traditional presumption against judicial discretion in the
area of foreign affairs. As a result of such safeguards, "the
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle
to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of
establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national
interest or with international justice."5 0  This standard is a
judicially self-imposed restraint. Still, as Justice Story once
noted, "[ilt does not follow ... that because a principle cannot
be found settled by the consent or practice of nations at one
time, it is to be concluded, that at no subsequent period the
principle can be considered as incorporated into the public
code of nations."' This theory of the federal courts
influenced the Court to leave the door open to a narrow class
of international norms.
C. Future
Thus, a certain degree of indeterminacy persists,
allowing courts to experiment. In Fildrtiga, the Second
Circuit noted that "courts must interpret international law
not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among
the nations of the world today."52 The Sosa court echoed this
sentiment, declaring "the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international
norms today."" Today, courts recognize genocide, certain war
crimes, piracy, slavery, forced labor, and aircraft hijacking as
violations 54 of international law that do not require state
49. Kadic v. Karadii6, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
50. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
51. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 15,551).
52. Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
53. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. The Sosa Court rejected the argument, first
articulated by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984), that the Alien Tort Statute required a separate congressional
authorization, calling this thesis implausible. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731. The Court
also gutted the claim that actionable norms must share all of the historical
characteristics of the three original violations. See id. at 732 (citing Fildrtiga,
630 F.2d at 890). See also Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa- Federal
Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute, and Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT'L L.J.
1, 23-26 (2007). Under the ATS, courts apply international law not as it existed
in the eighteenth century, but as it is understood today.
54. The ATS only requires the violation of an international norm-a point
often lost on foreign scholars. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae International Law
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action. Sosa gave the lower courts significant discretion in
deciding what remedies should be available for a cognizable
international norm. 6 The judicial modesty exercised by the
Court, however, has been a double-edged sword. Though it
welcomed "congressional guidance,"" none has been
forthcoming. Meanwhile, there is mounting pressure from
the lower courts for clearer guidelines to this burgeoning field
of litigation. Sosa cries out for clarification.
One element of the Sosa system that requires
clarification is which body of law governs an entity's liability.
If federal common law applies, there is no doubt corporations
can be haled into court under the ATS." Corporate liability
is well grounded in this body of law.5 9 Consequently, Part II
is designed as an argument in the alternative. Even if the
Court were to decide that international law governs entity
liability, corporations could still be held responsible under the
ATS.
Professors in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, No. 09-56381
(9th Cir. Dec. 24, 2009). The violation need not rise to the level of an
international crime. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731. This has always been the case. See
Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). For example, when
Fildrtiga was decided, torture was universally prohibited, but not an
international crime. Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 884. In sum, "sources of
international law that cannot alone establish torts are still 'potent authority for
universal acceptance' of a norm." In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp.
2d 228, 249 n.89 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163,
180 (2d Cir. 2009)).
55. Chimhne I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 70-71 (2008). Corporations may also be liable for another set
of crimes when they are engaged in official action under color of law. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). See also Kadic v. KaradEi, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir.
1995). The "under color of law" analysis, however, is completely unnecessary
for violations of international law unrelated to a certain set of war crimes.
But see Curtis Bradley, State Action and Corporate Human Rights
Liability (Mar. 14, 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid =1540269.
56. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
57. Id. at 731.
58. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
438 (1989) ("The Alien Tort Statute by its terms does not distinguish among
classes of defendants . . . ."); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315
(11th Cir. 2008) ("The text of the Alien Tort Statute provides no express
exception for corporations . . . .") (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (2001); Cook County v. United States ex
rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125-26 (2003).
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II. THE LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Private liability exists under customary international
law. The notion that the law of nations governs only relations
between States is of relatively recent provenance.60  The
Founding Fathers believed that individuals had rights and
duties under the law of nations.' In Henfield's Case, James
Wilson held that "oin states as well as individuals the duties
of humanity are strictly incumbent."6 2 In his landmark
treatise, Henry Wheaton noted that "[plrivate individuals, or
public and private corporations may . .. become the subjects
of this law in regard to rights growing out of their
international relations with foreign sovereigns and states, or
their subjects and citizens."" Thus, when international
bodies began to codify individual responsibility during the
first half of the twentieth century, they were not so much
60. Myres S. McDougal & Gertrude C. K. Leighton, The Rights of Man in
the World Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Action, 59 YALE
L.J. 60, 74 (1949) (arguing against the "nineteenth century canards that
international law is the law of states and their relations to each other, with all
enforcement and negotiations in the states alone").
61. They drew heavily from Blackstone who recognized private
international law-such as law merchant-as part of municipal law. See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *67-73. "[Iln vain would nations in their
collective capacity observe these universal rules, if private subjects were at
liberty to break them at their own discretion .... " Id. at *68. Citing Blackstone
in Sosa, Justice Souter specifically referred to "rules binding individuals for the
benefit of other individuals" which "overlapped with the norms of state
relationships." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at
*68). See also Wilson, supra note 23, at 138 ("'Thus the law of natural equality,
which prohibits injury and commands the reparation of damage done; the law of
beneficence and of fidelity to our engagements, are laws respecting nations, and
imposing, both on the people and on their respective sovereigns, the same duties
as are prescribed to individuals.'") (quoting JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI,
PRINCIPES DU DROIT POLITIQUE 121 (Nugent, trans., 4th ed., 1792)).
62. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360)
(recognizing pre-existing private duties under international law).
As a citizen of the United States, he was bound to act no part which
could injure the nation; he was bound to keep the peace in regard to all
nations with whom we are at peace. This is the law of nations; not an
ex post facto law, but a law that was in existence long before Gideon
Henfield existed.
Id. at 1120.
63. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (6th ed., 1855).
See also Mexican Boundary-Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op. Att'y Gen.
250, 251 (1907) ("[A] right of action and a forum [is provided] to citizens of
Mexico who have been injured by the action of the irrigation company.").
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expanding the bailiwick of international law as they were
returning to more ancient understandings about the nature of
individual responsibility. Individual command responsibility
for crimes against humanity emerged as a principle of
customary international law during the 1919 deliberations of
the Commission on Responsibility and Sanctions.6 4  This
responsibility was ultimately codified during the Second
World War in Control Council Law No. 10," which recognized
private individual and corporate liability,66 as well-
64. COMM'N ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND ON
ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES, VIOLATION OF LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR 19-24
(1919).
65. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20 1945. See also
Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in
International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1094 (2009); Andrew Clapham, The Complexity of International Criminal Law:
Looking Beyond Individual Responsibility to the Responsibility of
Organizations, Corporations and States, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN A WORLD OF
STATES 233, 234 (2004) (arguing that under Control Council Law No. 10
juridical persons "can commit international crimes under international law").
66. See Abraham L. Pomerantz, Feasibility and Propriety of Indicting LG.
Farben and Krupp as Corporate Entities (Gantt Papers, Aug. 27, 1946),
reprinted in Bush, supra note 65, at 1247.
[I]t is clear that the draftsmen did not intend to exclude criminal
corporations from its scope. For example, Art. 1 of the quadrapartite
agreement provides for the trial of war criminals, "whether they be
accused individually or in their capacity as members of organizations
or groups or in both capacities". Here the word "individually" is clearly
intended to contradistinguish "representative" liability. Certainly, it is
not used to distinguish "individual" from "corporate" liability.
Id. That corporations are legitimate legal entities made no difference. I.G.
Farben was subject to international law not as a criminal organization (like the
Gestapo) but because it had violated international law. See Bush, supra note
65, at 1098 (noting that only individuals were charged at the Nuremberg trials
and "[o]ccasional suggestions to the contrary by human rights scholars are
mistaken"). But see Kendra Magraw, Universally Liable? Corporate-Complicity
Liability Under the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 458,
470 (ignoring Control Council Law No. 10 in arguing that "the Nuremberg
Tribunals only had the jurisdiction to try individuals"); Harold Hongju Koh,
Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J
INT'L ECON. L. 263, 266 (2004) (confusing two different tribunals in arguing that
"the Nuremberg Charter permitted prosecution of a private group or
organization" such as Flick, I.G. Farben and Krupp); Andrew Clapham, The
Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons,
in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw
139, 170-171 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000) (arguing the
"Farben judgement can be read as implying that the Farben company itself had
committed the relevant war crime, even though the Tribunal had no jurisdiction
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entrenched elements of international law.
A. From Nuremberg ...
The military tribunals at Nuremberg played a central
role in clarifying private liability under customary
international law. These tribunals had jurisdiction over
corporations,67  but, for reasons of legal and political
expediency, none were ever charged. Initially, the chief
obstacle to trying the German corporations was the
"particularly complicated governance structure [s]" of large
cartels like I.G. Farben.6" As relations among the Allies
deteriorated during the trials, British and American lawyers
also developed concerns about the political effects of holding
German corporations liable for their crimes.6 9  Nonetheless,
during the trials of individual industrialists the tribunals
"routinely spoke in terms of corporate responsibilities and
obligations.7 o In United States v. Krauch, for example, the
tribunal referred to "a juristic person" that acquired private
property "against the will and consent of the former owner."7
Judge Hebert wrote of "action on the part of Farben [which]
constituted a violation of the Hague Regulations."7
Endorsing the view that the "concept of corporate liability for
jus cogens violations has its roots in the trials of German war
criminals after World War II," the Southern District of New
York has recognized that the tribunals talked in terms of
over Farben as such"). The tribunal had jurisdiction over corporations.
67. Bush, supra note 65, at 1094-95 ("[C]riminal charges against
corporations were considered entirely permissible, though ultimately not
used.").
68. Id. at 1170.
69. Donald Bloxham, "The Trial that Never Was": Why There Was No
Second International Trial of Major War Criminals at Nuremberg, 87 J. HIST.
41, 51 (2002) ("Jackson went on to express the fear that attacking industrialists
would 'tend to discourage industrial co-operation with our Government in
maintaining its defences [sic] in the future while not at all weakening the Soviet
position, since they [did] not rely upon private enterprise."' (quoting Robert H.
Jackson, Final Report to the President Concerning the Nurnberg War Crimes
Trial (1946)), reprinted in TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 277 (1949)).
70. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 477 (2001).
71. 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS 1132 (1948) [hereinafter T.W.C.].
72. Id. at 1081, 1140.
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"Farben's . . . activities, . . . offenses against property" and
crimes "committed by Farben, and . . . action[s] of Farben."7 3
Similarly, in United States v. Krupp, the tribunal held that
the confiscation and use of a French factory "by the Krupp
firm constituteld] a violation of Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations ... [and] the Krupp firm, through defendants ...
voluntarily and without duress participated in these
violations."74 The firms in turn acted as if they were on trial.
Rather than distance itself from the proceedings, I.G. Farben
provided essential resources, including attorneys, specialists,
and expert accountants, to defend the firm's conduct and that
of the officers on trial.75
The individual prosecutions of various industrialists
removed all doubt about private liability under customary
international law." "Where private persons, including
juristic persons, proceed to exploit the military occupancy by
acquiring private property against the will and consent of the
former owner, such action . . . is in violation of international
law."7 Shifting its gaze beyond individual complicity, the
American tribunal held in Wolheim v. I.G. Farben that "the
fundamental principles of equality, justice and humanity
must have been known to all civilized persons, and the I.G.
Corporation cannot evade its responsibility any more than
can an individual."7 8
The emerging consensus after Nuremberg was that
juridical personhood under international law extended to
natural and legal persons.7 1 "[C]orporations or partnerships,"
73. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Ratner, supra note 70, at 478).
74. 9 T.W.C., supra note 71, 1352-53.
75. Clapham, supra note 65, at 239.
76. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 204-07 (2d ed., 2006). A classic
example of secondary liability is the Zyklon B case. See In re Tesch & Others
(British Mil. Ct. 1946), in 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 93 (1947); see also infra notes 253 and 269 and
accompanying text.
77. 8 T.W.C., supra note 71, at 1153.
78. INT'L PEACE ACAD. & FAFO, BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES:
ASSESSING THE LIABILITY OF BUSINESS ENTITIES FOR GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 20 (2004) (citing Wollheim v. I. G. Farben in Liquidation,
Frankfurt District Court, June 10, 1953, court file no. 2/3/0406/51), available at
http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications /businessand -intcrime.pdf.
79. The International Court of Justice recognized private juridical
personhood of organizations in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
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Philip Jessup remarked, "may also be subjects of
international law."8  Some, like Hersch Lauterpacht, went
even further, arguing that
the individual is the ultimate unit of all law, international
and municipal, in the double sense that the obligations of
international law are ultimately addressed to him and
that the development, the well-being and the dignity of
the individual human being are a matter of direct concern
to international law.81
Though these duties remained unenforceable for much of
the next sixty years, they were not diminished.82
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 ICJ REP. 174, 178 (Apr. 11).
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in
nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends on the
needs of the community. Throughout its history, the development of
international law has been influenced by the requirements of
international life, and . . . has already given rise to instances of action
upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States.
Id. Indeed, Professor Ian Brownlie had ceaselessly noted since 1966 that
"[t]here is no general rule that the individual cannot be a 'subject of
international law,' and in particular contexts he appears as a legal person on
the international plane." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (7th ed. 2008). Suffice it to say non-state entities are
liable under customary international law whether they are labeled "subjects" or
"participants." This Article does not aim to resolve that debate. See ANDREW
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 80 (2006)
("Conflating the question of subjectivity with the concepts of international legal
personality and international capacity has prevented a clear appreciation of the
fact that non-state actors can bear international rights and obligations (even
where they have no state-like characteristics or pretensions)."); ROSALYN
HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT
48-55 (1994) (rejecting the subject-object dichotomy in favor of the participant
model); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 230 (1964) ("[Plrivate corporations ... are now participants in the evolution
of modern international law.").
80. Philip C. Jessup, The Subjects of a Modern Law of Nations, 45 MICH. L.
REV. 383, 387 (1947).
81. Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing
Public International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 764 n.37 (quoting Hersch
Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L
L. 1, 27 (1946)).
82. NICOLA JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 38 (2002)
("The absence of direct enforcement for private parties at the international level
does not necessarily bar horizontal effect; it merely means that the enforcement
of the obligations for non-State entities is indirect . . . ."); Volker Nerlich, Core
Crimes and Transnational Business Corporations, 8 J. INTL'L CRIM. JUST. 895,
895 (2010) ("While currently there is no international court or tribunal that can
exercise criminal jurisdiction over private legal persons for core crimes, this
does not mean that the prohibitions underlying these crimes are not binding on
transnational business corporations.").
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Corporations are subject to international law even when no
forum exists to prosecute them. Obligations exist even in the
absence of international enforcement mechanisms, which, in
any case, have "never been the linchpin of the obligation
itself."8 3 The fact that private individuals may not be
currently haled before the International Court of Justice says
nothing about private liability under international law.'
Though they lack the full set of legal rights enjoyed by states,
like the ability to bring a claim before the ICJ,6 persons are
nonetheless liable for violations of international law, which
can be remedied in domestic courts." These national courts,
in turn, have broad discretion regarding the rules of decision
and liability when enforcing international obligations.8 7  It
was this consensus that led the Second Circuit to reject the
argument that international law binds "only states and
persons acting under color of a state's law, not private
83. Ratner, supra note 70, at 476. See also ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 144-50 (2005); Andrew Clapham, The Role of the
Individual in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 25, 29 (2010).
84. But see Julian Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the
Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking 22 (2010)
(unpublished paper), available at http://works.bepress.com/juliankull/.
85. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1); Barcelona
Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Second Phase) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ
REP. 3 (Feb. 5). Suffice it to say that Barcelona Traction does not foreclose
jurisdiction over a corporation on a base other than nationality. But see Ku,
supra note 84, at 22. International law of jurisdiction recognizes no accepted
test for corporate nationality and makes no distinction between corporations
and individuals. See Barcelona Traction, 1970 ICJ REP. at 42 ("In allocating
corporate entities to States for purposes of diplomatic protection, international
law is based . . . on an analogy with the rules governing the nationality of
individuals .... [Ihn the particular field of the diplomatic protection of corporate
entities, no absolute test of the 'genuine connection' has found acceptance. Such
tests as have been applied are of a relative nature, and sometimes links with
one state have had to be weighed against those of another."). Thus, even if
application of the ATS were considered an exercise in diplomatic protection,
which it most assuredly is not, international law would not foreclose jurisdiction
over foreign corporations. Since the ATS is a form of adjudicatory jurisdiction,
Barcelona Traction is of no relevance, except, perhaps, in its discussion of erga
omnes norms. See id. at 32; see also infra Part III.
86. CLAPHAM, supra note 79, at, 59-83; Clapham, supra note 83, at 27.
87. See Kadic v. KaradEi(i, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The law of
nations generally does not create private causes of action to remedy its
violations, but leaves to each nation the task of defining the remedies that are
available for international law violations."); Eileen Denza, The Relationship
Between International Law and National Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 415, 415
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003) ("[I]nternational law does not itself prescribe how
it should be applied or enforced at the national level.").
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
individuals."" International law leaves a great deal of
discretion to national courts regarding rules of decision and
liability.
Faced with this overwhelming consensus, opponents of
ATS litigation have resorted to dusting off venerable, yet
badly outdated, treatises like Oppenheim's International
Law." In lines that have scarcely changed since 1905,
Professor Oppenheim informs us that, "the subjects of the
rights and duties arising from international law are states
solely and exclusively."90 Today, however, private criminal
liability is uncontroversial and the debate has shifted to what
is now the perennial question: which courts are best suited to
prosecute corporations for violations of international law?9"
Are they international tribunals or should this task be left to
domestic courts? The drafters of the Rome Statute, for
example, agreed to set these corporate cases outside of the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 92 Yet
this decision does not indicate that corporations are not liable
under international law, as some commentators have
claimed. 93  It merely suggests that the drafters believed
jurisdiction over corporations would detract from the limited
focus of the ICC. 94 As even a cursory reading reveals, the
Rome Statute by its own terms neither reflects nor sets out
customary international law.95 One simply cannot assume
88. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
89. See Ku, supra note 84, at 21-22.
90. Id. (citing 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (Sir Robert Jennings
& Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992)). The only difference here between the
First and Ninth editions is the substitution of the phrase "international law" for
"law of nations." See LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 341 (1st ed.
1905). The excerpt is also inconsistent with later revisions made by
Lauterpacht in LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 639 (8th ed. 1955)
("[Various developments since the two World Wars no longer countenance the
view that, as a matter of positive law, States are the only subjects of
international law.").
91. Clapham, supra note 66, at 139-196.
92. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
93. Compare Ku, supra note 84, at 28, with Andrew Clapham, supra note
66, at 191 ("[No delegation challenged the conceptual assumption that legal
persons are bound by international criminal law.").
94. See Kai Ambos, Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
746 (Otto Trifiterer ed., 2008).
95. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 10, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 ("Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or
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that the purview of international courts encompasses all
international law. It bears repeating: corporations are
subject to international law even when no international
forum exists to prosecute them.96  Focusing on international
tribunals also obscures the significant advances domestic
courts have made to enforce international law. Some
commentators have doubted whether "there are any material
examples outside the United States of national courts
imposing criminal liability on corporations for international
law violations."' In fact, laws imposing criminal liability on
corporations for violations of international law are
widespread." The point would be moot, however, even if
there was no such domestic practice in foreign states. It is a
well-established rule of international law that the presence or
absence of widespread domestic legal practice does not
necessarily give rise to a rule of customary international
law.99
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for
purposes other than this Statute."); see infra notes 255-57. The statute does
not supplant existing customary international law.
96. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
97. Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in
Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271, 304 (2009).
98. Over half a dozen states, including Australia, Canada, France, the
Netherlands, Norway, and the UK, impose criminal liability on corporations for
violations of international law. See, e.g., Joanna Kryiakakis, Australian
Prosecution of Corporations for International Crimes, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 809
(2007); Debbie Johnston, Lifting the Veil on Corporate Terrorism: The Use of the
Criminal Code Terrorism Framework to Hold Multinational Corporations
Accountable for Complicity in Human Rights Violations Abroad, 66 U. TORONTO
FAC. L. REV. 137 (2008); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal
Transnationalization and Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM.
J. COMP. L. 363 (2008); U.N Human Rights Council, Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Mapping
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts,
IT 19-32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4135 (Feb. 19, 2007); U.N Human Rights Council,
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Promotion and
Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Including the Right of Development, 31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7,
2008). See generally Robert C. Thompson, Anita Ramasastry & Mark B. Taylor,
Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities
Implicated in International Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 841 (2009).
99. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIxTY-NINTH
CONFERENCE 720 (2000) (citing Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees (U.K. V.
Fr.) 1923 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7)). International law defers to
domestic law on questions of an entity's liability and Sosa's universality
requirement is limited to the violated norm. See supra notes 54 and 87. That is
why the European Commission acknowledged that "a subset of norms that
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B. . . . to the Southern District of New York
Despite this wealth of evidence, a few respected scholars
maintain that there are no "accepted rules or standards for
corporate criminal responsibility under international law."oo
These arguments have been rejected when introduced as
expert testimony in the lower federal courts. "Limiting civil
liability to individuals while exonerating the corporation
directing the individual's action," Judge Weinstein noted,
"makes little sense in today's world."' Although Professor
James Crawford's argument is much more subtle than those
that flatly deny the existence of private individual liability,102
it relies on a fundamental assumption that the lower courts
have deemed unwarranted: that the accepted standard for
private liability does not cover corporate liability. The courts
have not supported this assumption. In an early round of
make up customary international law apply to non-state actors, such as
corporations." Brief of European Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 4, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339).
It is also why in Balintulo v. Daimler AG, the German government explicitly
noted that it argued that the "Plaintiffs claim against Daimler should be heard
in Germany, not that corporations cannot be held accountable for these claims."
Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of the Plaintiffs-
Appellees, Balintulo v. Daimler AG, at 15, No. 09-2778-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2009)
(citing Letter from German Government, at 1 (Oct. 8, 2009)).
100. Declaration of James Crawford at 11, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy. Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 01-cv-9882);
see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 55 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (rejecting the argument that international law "does not, in the context of
international criminal law or elsewhere, impose obligations or liability on
juridical actors or artificial persons such as corporations") (citing Declaration of
Kenneth Howard Anderson Jr. at 45, In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373
F. Supp. 2d 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04-CV-400).
101. In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58-59.
102. Compare Declaration of Christopher Greenwood at 6, Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy. Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(No. 01-cv-9882), and Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Christopher Greenwood,
CMG, QC in Support of Defendant-Appellee, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d. Cir. 2009) (No. 07-cv-0016), with U.N.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, art. 58, in Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) at 383, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(Nov. 2001) ("These articles are without prejudice to any question of the
individual responsibility under international law . . . ."). See also JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 312 (2002) ("[It is
not excluded that developments may occur in the field of individual civil
responsibility. As a saving clause article 58 is not intended to exclude that
possibility; hence the use of the general term 'individual responsibility.'").
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proceedings against Talisman Energy, Judge Schwartz held
that "corporations may also be held liable under international
law, at least for gross human rights violations."103 In Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, the Ninth Circuit similarly concluded that
corporations could be held vicariously liable for violations of
jus cogens norms.10 4  Even the Eleventh Circuit has noted
that corporations may be liable for aiding and abetting
violations of international law. 0 Indeed, only one case has
ever been outright dismissed under the theory that
corporations are not liable under the ATS.106  That court
erred in asserting that a crime against humanity can only be
committed by "a State or State-like organization."107 Not
even Professor Crawford would endorse this reading of the
law. 108
Most courts have followed the Second Circuit, which has
"repeatedly treated the issue of whether corporations may be
held liable under the [ATS] as indistinguishable from the
question of whether private individuals may be."'0o From
Nuremberg to the Southern District of New York, courts have
consistently affirmed that private liability exists in customary
international law.
That all changed on September 17, 2010 when the Second
103. Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 319 (adding that a "private
corporation is a juridical person and has no per se immunity under U.S.
domestic or international law.").
104. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC., 487 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2007).
105. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009);
Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
106. Abagninin v. Amvac Chemical Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2008).
See infra note 298. Similar claims were made in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No.
C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL2455752, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) ("The problem
with plaintiffs argument is that it attempts to hold . . . private actors[]
accountable for aiding and abetting violations of international law that can only
be committed by state officials."); and In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F.
Supp. 2d 538, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Both claims were later rejected. See
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Khulumani v.
Barclay Nat. Bank. Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007).
107. Abagninin, 545 F.3d at 741.
108. See, e.g., James Crawford, The Drafting of the Rome Statute, in FROM
NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE 109-56 (Phillip Sands ed., 2003); James Crawford
& Simon Olleson, The Nature and Form of International Responsibility, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 87, at 445-72.
109. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) ("On at least nine separate occasions, the Second Circuit has addressed
[ATS] cases against corporations without ever hinting-much less holding-that
such cases are barred.").
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Circuit held, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, "that
corporate liability is not a discernable-much less universally
recognized-norm of customary international law.""'o This
conclusion is based on several unwarranted assumptions that
deserve close scrutiny.
C. What International Law is Not
The Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel betrays a
profound ignorance about the nature and historical
development of international law. It stands athwart
precedent, evidence, and logic. Judge Jos6 Cabranes was
responsible for writing the majority opinion, which was joined
by Chief Judge Jacobs. Judge Pierre Leval concurred with
the decision, "but not on the basis of the supposed rule of
international law the majority has fashioned.""' This
observation gets to the heart of the problem. Judge
Cabranes's majority opinion manufactures rules that have no
basis in international law,' 12 and misstates international
jurisprudence. 113 Unfortunately, the sheer volume of
misinformation makes this an especially difficult case to
analyze: there is no obvious rubric. To understand this
decision, one must reconstruct the development of
international law, starting with the most basic error.
Judge Cabranes misstates the relationship between
obligation, liability, and enforcement in international law.
Throughout the majority opinion he assumes that
international enforcement is a prerequisite to the emergence
of an obligation under customary international law." 4  This
leads to a single-minded focus on enforcement, rather than on
obligation, most readily apparent when he addresses Judge
Leval's claim that customary international law consists of
110. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, slip
op. at 2 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.
gov/decisions/isysquery/29600323-c7e7-4833-835e-00536a406aa7/2/doc/06-4800-
cvopn.pdf#xml=.
111. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL
3611392, at *28 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010). According to Judge Leval the
allegations fell short of the mandatory standards set up by the Second Circuit in
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d. Cir.
2009), and by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
112. See infra notes 114-130.
113. See infra notes 138-149.
114. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *8, *12-16.
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established "norms of prohibited conduct" and "says little or
nothing about how those norms should be enforced."" Judge
Cabranes argues that "under Judge Leval's approach
Nuremberg was not a detectable advance of international
law. That is because, in his view, international law merely
'establishe[s] . . . norms of prohibited conduct' and leaves
individual States to determine the scope of liability."116  In
responding to Judge Leval, Judge Cabranes equates liability
with enforcement positing that "[iblefore the Second World
War, international law provided few protections of the human
rights of individuals."" Judge Cabranes believes this fact is
meaningful, and that enforcement creates liability and
obligations. This approach finds no support in international
law. In fact, the opposite is true. Obligations create
liabilities, which then may be enforced under customary
international law.
The Nuremberg trials did not extend the scope of liability
to individuals.' Not only did these obligations predate any
international enforcement mechanism, but they also informed
national trials of individuals for violations of international
law.119 It is simply not true that international law imposed
no obligations on individuals prior to Nuremberg. Nor is it
the case that national courts never before enforced these
obligations. The Leipzig and Constantinople trials in the
aftermath of the First World War are two prominent
examples. 2 0 The Nuremberg trials were exceptional because
115. Id. at *27.
116. Id. at *8, n.29 (citing Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *27 (Leval, J.,
concurring)).
117. Id. at *13, n.36 (emphasis added).
118. Robert McCorquodale, The Individual and the International Legal
System, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 87, at 307 ("Prior to [the
enforcement of individual responsibility through international tribunals], the
individual responsibility still existed, and was occasionally enforced in national
courts, even though no international judicial body enforced it. . . . The
responsibility arose through customary international law. . . . ").
119. Cabranes's citation to Justice Jackson underscores this point: "As
Justice Jackson explained, the London Charter 'is a basic charter in the
International Law of the future,' and the Nuremberg trials took great strides in
'ma[king] explicit and unambiguous' the human rights norms that had
'theretofore . . . [been] implicit in International Law.'" Kiobel, 2010 WL
3611392, at *13 (citing Robert H. Jackson, Justice Jackson's Final Report to the
President Concerning the Nurnberg War Crimes Trial, 20 TEMP. L.Q. 338, 342
(1947)).
120. ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON & ELIZABETH
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they represented the first time an international court
exercised jurisdiction over persons. The limit of an
international court's jurisdiction does not define the limits of
liability. They are questions of entirely different bodies of
substantive law. Scholars have repeatedly noted that
international enforcement mechanisms have "never been the
linchpin of the obligation itself."12 1 The existence of a "rule of
substantive international law providing for the punishment of
legal persons for core crimes" does not depend on whether an
international mechanism has jurisdiction. 122 Indeed,
corporations are subject to international law even when no
forum exists to prosecute them, and they may be held liable
in domestic courts. These courts, in turn, can apply the
dormant norms "without breach of the nullum crinmen
principle."'23
The majority opinion provides an incomplete and often
misleading account of the historical development of the
relevant international law. Judge Cabranes claims, for
instance, that corporate criminal liability has only recently
obtained acceptance among European legal theorists when in
fact such a consensus was already visible in 1932.124 That
year, Emil Rappaport observed that "[tihe conflict concerning
the nature of the liability of corporations, which seemed at
first sight so difficult to settle, has disappeared in these last
years."125 That would explain why lawyers at Nuremberg
WILMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 65 (2d ed., 2010).
121. Ratner, supra note 70, at 11.
122. Nerlich, supra note 82, 899.
123. Id.
124. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL
3611392, at *20, n.43 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010).
125. Emil S. Rappaport, The Problem of the Inter-state Criminal Law, 18
TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 41, 54 (1932). Rappaport went on to
explain that the emerging formula "satisfied the representatives of different
scientific tendencies and has definitively solved the question of the theoretical
foundation of the new international criminal code." Id. For examples of the
emerging consensus see the contributions of Niko Gunsburg, Raymond
Mommaert, Jos6 Agustin Martinez, Jean Andr6 Roux, Silvio Longhi, Salvatore
Cicala, Mieczyslaw Ettinger, Jean Radulesco, and Thomas Givanovitch at the
1929 congress of the International Association of Penal Law that were
published in 6 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PPNAL 219-310 (1929). See
also Megalos Caloyani, La Responsabilitd pinale des personnes morales, in
DEUXIPME CONGRPS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PRNAL, BUCAREST (6-12
OCTOBRE 1929) 73-104 (1930).
102 [Vol:51
2011] THE FUTURE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 103
universally accepted the principle that corporations were
liable for violations of customary international law. The
leading authority on corporations at Nuremberg has never
encountered a document suggesting otherwise.'2 6 Indeed,
there is compelling evidence that legal authorities at the time
made no distinction between corporate and individual
liability.127 The same holds true today.'2 8 Elsewhere Judge
Cabranes notes that "[i]nternational law is not silent on the
question of the subjects of international law . . . [nior does
international law leave to individual States the responsibility
of defining those subjects."'2 9 This statement is correct. The
assumption, however, that only subjects bear obligations
under customary international law, is false.13 0  Judge
Cabranes is looking for something that cannot be found
because international law makes no distinction between the
obligations of natural and juridical persons.
To support his point of view, Judge Cabranes offers well-
known quotes stripped of their context. "From the
beginning," Judge Cabranes asserts, "the principle of
individual liability for violations of international law has
been limited to natural persons." 1 3  He offers no support for
this argument except for a few well-known quotes by Justice
Jackson: "[cirimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provision of
international law be enforced."132 Justice Jackson, of course,
was referring only to states. According to Professor Jonathan
Bush, the remark "was plainly said with the aim of ensuring
126. Conversation with Professor Jonathan Bush, Columbia Law School
(Sept. 20, 2010).
127. Bush, supra note 65, at 1150-51, 1247.
128. Robert McCorquodale, supra note 118, at 300. Even Professor Carlos
Vizquez concedes that "the scope of corporate responsibility under international
law is probably no different from that of other non-state actors who are engaged
in similar activity." Carlos M. Vdzquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of
Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 930
n.10 (2005).
129. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *7-8.
130. CLAPHAM, supra note 79, at 80 ("Conflating the question of subjectivity
with the concepts of international legal personality and international capacity
has prevented a clear appreciation of the fact that non-state actors can bear
international rights and obligations (even where they have no state-like
characteristics or pretensions.)"). See also supra note 79.
131. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *2.
132. Id. (quoting The Nuremberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946)).
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that natural persons could not hide behind artificial entities
like the state."'3 3 The remark did not exclude corporate
liability. Justice Jackson's next sentence makes this clear:
"[w]hile it is quite proper to employ the fiction of
responsibility of a state or corporation for the purpose of
imposing a collective liability, it is quite intolerable to let
such a legalism become the basis of personal immunity."'3 4
The second Justice Jackson quote draws no distinction
between natural and juridical persons: "for the commission of
such crimes individuals are responsible." 35 Judge Cabranes
nevertheless insists that "no tribunal at Nuremberg had the
jurisdiction to charge-let alone impose judgment on-a
corporation."136 Lawyers at Nuremberg thought differently:
"[i]t is clear that the draftsmen did not intend to exclude
criminal corporations from its scope."' 7
Throughout the majority opinion, Judge Cabranes
repeatedly claims that "every international tribunal to
confront the question of whether the liability of non-state
actors for violations of customary international law should
extend to both natural and juridical persons has considered
and rejected corporate liability."3 8  He cites no cases to
support this assertion because no international tribunal has
confronted this 'question.' It is entirely of Cabranes's own
making. His analysis of the I.G. Farben case is illustrative.
Judge Cabranes asserts that "[t]he refusal of the military
tribunal at Nuremberg to impose liability on I.G. Farben is
133. Bush, supra note 65, at 1162.
134. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 150 (1947).
135. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *2 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Final
Report to the President Concerning the Nurnberg War Crimes Trial, 20 Temp.
L.Q. 338, 342 (1946)).
136. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *3, n.22.
137. Abraham L. Pomerantz, Feasibility and Propriety of Indicting I.G.
Farben and Krupp as Corporate Entities (Gantt Papers, Aug. 27, 1946),
reprinted in Bush, supra note 65, at 1247.
138. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *3, n.22. "International tribunals have
continually declined to hold corporations liable for violations of customary
international law." Id. at *15. "Looking to international law, we find a
jurisprudence, first set forth at Nuremberg and repeated by every international
tribunal of which we are aware, that offenses against the law of nations (i.e.,
customary international law) for violations of human rights can be charged
against States and against individual men and women but not against juridical
persons such as corporations." Id. at *3.
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not a matter of happenstance or oversight."139 The military
tribunal refused no such thing. The discretion to charge
corporations was left to the prosecutors, who ultimately
decided against prosecuting I.G. Farben for reasons of
expedience. 40 The complicated governance structure of I.G.
Farben made it impractical to charge the corporation.141
Judge Cabranes's analysis goes against the weight of
historical evidence and turns entirely on a selective quotation
from the I.G. Farben decision:
the corporate defendant, Farben, is not before the bar of
this Tribunal and cannot be subjected to criminal
penalties in these proceedings. We have used the term
"Farben" as descriptive of the instrumentality of cohesion
in the name of which the enumerated acts of spoliation
were committed. But corporations act through individuals
and, under the conception of personal individual guilt to
which previous reference has been made, the prosecution,
to discharge the burden imposed upon it in this case, must
establish by competent proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that an individual defendant was either a participant in
the illegal act or that, being aware thereof, he authorized
or approved it. 142
Judge Cabranes concludes that:
in declining to impose corporate liability under
international law in the case of the most nefarious
corporate enterprise known to the civilized world, while
prosecuting the men who led I.G. Farben, the military
tribunals .. . expressly defined liability under the law of
nations as liability that could not be divorced from
individual moral responsibility.'43
The passage from the I.G. Farben case, however, does not
refer to corporate liability. Rather, it refers to the use of
conspiracy liability, as the next sentence shows. Directly
after the point where Cabranes stops quoting, Judge Morris
continues:
Responsibility does not automatically attach to an act
proved to be criminal merely by virtue of a defendant's
membership in the Vorstand [the management board].
139. Id. at *14 (emphasis added).
140. Bush, supra note 65, at 1094-95.
141. Id. at 1170.
142. 8 T.W.C., supra note 71, at 1153.
143. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *15.
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Conversely, one may not utilize the corporate structure to
achieve an immunity from criminal responsibility for
illegal acts which he directs, counsels, aids, orders, or
abets. But the evidence must establish action of the
character we have indicated, with knowledge of the
essential elements of the crime.144
In short, the tribunal was not speaking about corporate
liability and merely expressed its unease with the application
of conspiracy liability to individual responsibility. 4 5
Judge Cabranes's use of historical evidence is equally
questionable in his analysis of more recent tribunals. For
instance, he claims that the Rome Statute represents the
"express rejection . . . of a norm of corporate liability in the
context of human rights violations" because its drafters did
not extend jurisdiction over corporations. 4 6 This use of the
travaux prdparatoires is problematic for several reasons. The
Rome Statute expressly rejects the notion that it reflects or
sets out customary international law.147 The statute clearly
states that "[niothing in this Part shall be interpreted as
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing
rules of international law for purposes other than this
Statute."148 The statute serves a more limited purpose:
determining the appropriate bailiwick for the new
international criminal court. Thus, the failure to provide
international remedies for certain well-established norms of
customary international law reflects political decisions about
which crimes the court is best suited to prosecute. Crimes not
included in the statute have not fallen out of customary
international law. Likewise, the decisions to limit the
144. 8 T.W.C., supra note 71 at 1153.
145. The influence of this distortion was immediate. During the Ninth
Circuit en banc hearing in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, Judge Silverman relied on Kiobel's
analysis of the I.G. Farben case to assert that "the United States decided that
as a corporation it could not be liable and just prosecuted the individuals." See
Oral Arguments, Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390, UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/medialview-subpage.php?pk-vid=0000006107; see
also Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co., No. 1:06-cv-00627 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2010).
146. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *18 (citing Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90).
147. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 10, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
148. Id.
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jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals reflected certain political
decisions about expediency. To impute vast legal meaning to
the drafters' omissions would be a mistake. That is
particularly true considering that at the Rome Statute
negotiations, for example, "no delegation challenged the
conceptual assumption that legal persons are bound by
international criminal law."149
The majority opinion relies on distinctions that have no
basis in international law, 150 and misstates international
jurisprudence.1"' Finally, Judge Cabranes claims that even if
there are no sources "of international law addressing
corporate liability, that supposed lack of authority would
actually support [the] holding."' 5 2 No, it would not.
Judge Cabranes's attempt to assimilate the rules of
domestic enforcement into the international conduct-
regulating norm analysis is illogical and defies the precedent
of the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court. His analysis is
based entirely on a misrepresentation of Khulumani and
Presbyterian Church, and a questionable analogy between
corporate liability and conduct-regulating norms of liability,
like aiding and abetting. A more complete analysis of the
choice of law dilemma under the ATS can be found in Part IV
of this Article.' For now, suffice it to say that courts must
look to international law to determine the relevant
substantive law. 5 4
The question then turns on whether the liability is
substantive or ancillary, in which case federal common law
may be applied.15 5  The analogy between corporate liability
and conduct-regulating norms of liability will only hold if
there is a substantive norm of international law. Some areas
of international law have not been sufficiently theorized to
distinguish between permissive and prohibitive norms-but
domestic enforcement is not one of them.'5 6  Domestic
149. Clapham, supra note 66, at 191.
150. See supra notes 114-130 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 138-149 and accompanying text.
152. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL
3611392, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010). Until Kiobel, this type of overreaching
was limited to appellate briefs. See infra notes 347-366.
153. See infra Part IV.
154. See infra note 222.
155. Casto, supra note 3, at 695.
156. See Denza, supra note 87, at 416 and Barcelona Traction, 1970 ICJ REP.
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enforcement is governed by permissive norms of international
law. Conduct-prohibiting norms, on the other hand, are
obligatory. Sosa's clear definition requirement applies only to
these obligatory conduct-regulating norms. In a nutshell,
"Sosa held that in ATS litigation the norm regulating conduct
must be found by the federal courts in international law.
Other rules of decision that are not conduct-regulating norms
are to be legislated by the courts as ordinary federal common
law.""' Professor Casto's conduct-regulating approach to the
Alien Tort Statute neatly dovetails with the logic of
international law.5 " Judge Cabranes would have courts look
to international mechanisms for all of the rules, even when
international law cannot provide an answer.
Judge Cabranes begins by arguing that since Sosa, the
Second Circuit has looked to "customary international law to
determine both whether certain conduct leads to ATS liability
and whether the scope of liability under the ATS extends to
the defendant being sued.""' He then leapfrogs to Chief
Judge Jacobs' decision in Presbyterian Church. He quotes
from Presbyterian Church unimpeachable statements such as
"footnote 20 of Sosa, while nominally concerned with the
liability of non-state actors, supports the broader principle
that the scope of liability for ATS violations should be derived
from international law" and "[r]ecognition of secondary
liability is no less significant a decision than whether to
recognize a whole new tort in the first place."16 o He then adds
his own personal gloss, arguing that in Presbyterian Church
the court "looked to international law to determine not only
what conduct is cognizable under the ATS, but also the
at 37 ("If the Court were to decide the case in disregard of the relevant
institutions of municipal law it would, without justification, invite serious legal
difficulties. It would lose touch with reality, for there are no corresponding
institutions of international law to which the Court could resort.").
157. Casto, supra note 3, at 695.
158. William Casto, Regulating the New Privateers of the Twenty-First
Century, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 695 (2006). This is not to deny the fact that
there is disagreement among international law scholars about the
relationship between violations and liability. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, A
Question About Kiobel, OPINIo JURIS (Sept. 19, 2010, 1:06 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/18/a-tentative-thought-on-kiobell.
159. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL
3611392, at *9 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010).
160. Id. at *9-10 (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy
Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258-59 (2d. Cir. 2009)).
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identity of the persons to whom that conduct is attributable
(in that case, aiders and abettors)."'e' Presbyterian Church
does not support this general principle because it adopted "as
the law of [the Second] Circuit" Judge Katzmann's more
limited rule in Khulumani. 162
Judge Cabranes claims that "[in Khulumani, Judge
Katzmann observed that aiding and abetting liability-much
like corporate liability-'does not constitute a discrete
criminal offense but only serves as a more particularized way
of identifying the persons involved' in the underlying
offense."163  But Judge Katzmann said no such thing.
Nowhere in his opinion does he draw an analogy with
corporate liability. Nor does he ever claim international law
governs domestic enforcement. Instead, he merely draws an
analogy between the substantive law of international
tribunals and domestic courts.'6 4  Judge Katzmann
articulates a general principle only when noting "that we
most effectively maintain the appropriate scope of [ATS]
jurisdiction by requiring that the specific conduct allegedly
committed by the defendants sued represents a violation of
international law."'6 ' Liability is conflated with jurisdiction.
Judge Katzmann is simply reiterating the basic fact that
courts look to international law when determining
substantive law.16 6 Sosa's footnote twenty, Judge Katzmann
notes, "is equally applicable to the question of where to look
to determine whether the scope of liability for a violation of
international law should extend to aiders and abettors."
This approach accurately reflects Sosa's conclusion that
international law supplies the conduct prohibiting norm while
161. Id. at *9.
162. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 256. "Presbyterian Church ... expressly adopted
Judge Katzmann's rule as the law of our Circuit." Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at
*22.
163. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *10.
164. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 280 (2d Cir.
2007).
165. Id. at 269 (Katzmann, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
166. Judge Katzmann mentions "two distinct analytical inquiries. One is
whether jurisdiction lies under the [ATS]. The other is whether to recognize a
common-law cause of action to provide a remedy for the alleged violation of
international law. Requiring this analytical separation in [ATS] litigation
comports with the general principle that whether jurisdiction exists and
whether a cause of action exists are two distinct inquiries." Id. at 266.
167. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *10 (citing Talisman, 582 F.3d at 256).
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federal common law governs ancillary rules. 68  Although
many lower courts recognize private liability under the Alien
Tort Statute, the Court never established in Sosa whether
"international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual." 6 1 It did hint, however, that corporations are
liable for certain violations of international law. 170
In Khulumani, Judge Katzmann rejected attempts by
Judge Korman to analogize between conduct-regulating
norms, like aiding and abetting liability of international law,
and norms of domestic enforcement like corporate liability.171
"We have repeatedly treated the issue of whether
corporations may be held liable under the [ATS] as
indistinguishable from the question of whether private
individuals may be."' 72 In Kiobel, the court sets these
concerns aside: "whatever Judge Katzmann's view on the
ultimate question of corporate liability under the ATS, his
reasoning in Khulumani leads to the inescapable conclusion
that customary international law governs the question.""'
This iron cage is entirely of Judge Cabranes's own making.
He finds support for his interpretation only by distorting the
decision of his colleague on the Second Circuit, and through
an expansive reading of the cryptic footnote twenty in Sosa.
On these grounds alone Kiobel merits en banc review.
In sum, although there may be ample evidence showing
that corporations were considered liable for violations of
customary international law at the Nuremberg trials,
plaintiffs do not bear the burden of proving this fact. Courts
applying the Alien Tort Statute look to international law only
168. Teddy Nemeroff, Note, Untying the Khulumani Knot: Corporate Aiding
and Abetting Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act after Sosa, 40 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 231, 282 (2008) ("A close reading of Sosa suggests that Judge
Korman's approach over-interprets footnote twenty, reading into it guidance
that the Court did not intend to provide.").
169. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
170. Id. (pairing corporate and individual liability together under the
heading: "private actor").
171. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 279 (2d Cir.
2007).
172. Id. at 282.
173. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL
3611392, at *10 n.33 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) (emphasis added).
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for substantive norms.'7 4 The clear definition requirement is
not applied to ancillary rules of enforcement.
The majority opinion is well summarized by Judge Leval:
Without any support in either the precedents or the
scholarship of international law, the majority take the
position that corporations, and other juridical entities, are
not subject to international law, and for that reason such
violators of fundamental human rights are free to retain
any profits so earned without liability to their victims.
... So long as they incorporate (or act in the form of a
trust), businesses will now be free to trade in or exploit
slaves, employ mercenary armies to do dirty work for
despots, perform genocides or operate torture prisons for a
despot's political opponents, or engage in piracy-all
without civil liability to victims.175
The Kiobel majority opinion is a radical departure from
established principles of international and domestic law. It
should be overturned posthaste.17 6
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPATIBILITY OF THE ATS WITH
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The ATS is a form of adjudicatory jurisdiction and
creates no jurisdictional conflicts with international law. 7
Custom, practice, the theory of conditional universal
jurisdiction, and the emerging consensus on local remedies for
torts in violation of international law all underscore this
conclusion.
A. Custom and Practice
Custom and practice provide a sound basis for the
extraterritorial application of the ATS. According to the
174. Any other interpretation would frustrate the purpose of the ATS and
render the statute a dead letter at the time when it was drafted by Congress.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Professor of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History,
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, at 15, No. 09-2778-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2009).
175. Kiobel, 2010 WL 3611392, at *25 (Leval, J.).
176. Judge Leval's repeated references to the "illogical," "strange," and
"internally inconsistent" analysis of the majority is an understatement. Id. at
*4. The recent decision in Doe v. Nestle is problematic for many of the same
reasons. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. 2:05-cv-
05513 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010).
177. Nonetheless, this continues to be a live issue in litigation. See infra
Part VI.
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Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, "jurisdiction on the
basis of universal interests has been exercised in the form of
criminal law, but international law does not preclude the
application of non-criminal law on this basis, for example, by
providing a remedy in tort or restitution for victims of
piracy."" Some scholars have challenged this position,
arguing that "international law principles of prescriptive
jurisdiction limit the ability of individual nations to regulate
conduct of non-nationals beyond national boundaries.""7
Under the ATS, however, courts exercise adjudicatory rather
than prescriptive jurisdiction.'10 Professor Dodge has noted
that "no basis for jurisdiction to prescribe is necessary" when
a court applies international law.181  Indeed, other scholars
have found that
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 cmt. b (1987).
179. Ramsey, supra note 97, at 272. "[Elven if the investor's conduct
arguably violates international law, U.S. courts cannot prescribe a remedy
unless it is within the subset of international law violations subject to universal
jurisdiction." Id. at 273. There are several problems with this argument. First,
ATS litigation is never based on universal jurisdiction. Defendants must have
minimum contact with the United States. See infra note 196. Second, Professor
Ramsey's argument relies heavily on the Court's decision in F. Hoffman-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). The case is inapposite to
ATS litigation and factually and normatively dissimilar. See Ramsey, supra
note 97, at 274. In Empagran, Justice Breyer was concerned about the
application of domestic antitrust laws to "foreign conduct insofar as that
conduct causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm alone gives rise
to the plaintiffs claim." Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165. Far from overturning
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), the Court sharpened
its effects analysis. The way to reconcile Breyer's same-term opinions in
Empagran and Sosa is to accept that certain violations of customary
international law "are enquirable, and may be proceeded against, in any
nation." Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 160 (1795). "The fact that this
procedural consensus exists," Breyer noted, "suggests that recognition of
universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set of norms is consistent with
principles of international comity." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). Thus, even as an exercise in
prescriptive jurisdiction, U.S. courts may hear claims under the ATS arising
from the set of norms identified in the text accompanying note 51. The final
problem is Ramsey's assumption that the ATS is an exercise in prescriptive
jurisdiction. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-38 (majority opinion). Significantly, no
other Justices joined Breyer's opinion in Sosa. Scholars have argued that the
majority endorsed a very broad application of the ATS. See, e.g., William S.
Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction Fallacy, HARV.
INT'L L.J. ONLINE 35, 44 (2010).
180. Dodge, supra note 179, at 37. See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 178 § 401.
181. Dodge, supra note 179, at 43.
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[uin practice the assumption of jurisdiction by a State does
not seem to be subject to any requirement that the
defendant or the facts of the case need have any
connection with the State; and this practice seems to have
met with acquiescence by other States. . . . It is hard to
resist the conclusion that (apart from the well-known
rules of immunity for foreign States, diplomats,
international organizations, etc.) customary international
law imposes no limits on the jurisdiction of municipal
courts in civil trials. 1 8 2
Even under Professor Ramsey's unconventional approach to
customary international law-defined purely in terms of
practice l8 3-it is unclear why ATS litigation would run afoul
of the laws of jurisdiction.
In practice, most states acquiesce to the assertion of
universal extraterritorial civil jurisdiction by U.S. courts. 184
182. Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y. B.
INT'L L. 145, 177 (1972) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also, Gerald
Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from the
Standpoint of the Rule of Law, in 92 RECUEIL DE COURS, 218 (1957 II) ("[Plublic
international law does not effect any delimitation of spheres of competence in
the civil sphere, and seems to leave the matter entirely to private international
law-that is to say in effect to the States themselves for determination, each in
accordance with its own internal law . . . .").
183. Compare Ramsey, supra note 97, at 271-74 ("[C]ustomary international
law arises from the actual practices of nations followed out of a sense of legal
obligation. . . . isolated and episodic decisions of a few international tribunals
are poor indicators of the common practice of nations."), with Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 38(d) (works of jurists are a "subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law") and P.E. Corbett, The Consent of
States and the Sources of the Law of Nations, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20, 29-30
(1925) ("Among such records or evidence, [proving international law] treaties
and practice play an essential part, though recourse must also be had to . . . the
writings of authoritative jurists."). Professor Ramsey's approach to CIL
resembles the controversial view of Carl Lueder, Krieg und Kriegsrecht im
Allgemeinen, HANDBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS 169 (1889). Suffice it to say that if
customary international law were determined solely through continuing
practice there never would have been a great controversy over the German legal
doctrine of kriegsraison during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
See Elihu Root, Presidential Address at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, April 27, 1921, 7 INT'L CONCILIATION
259, 263 (1921) ("Either the doctrine of kriegsraison must be abandoned
definitely and finally, or there is an end of international law . . . ."). The norm
against the kriegraison justification, like many other principles of international
law, was derived from the work jurists. Professor Ramsey also fails to consider
the extent to which the norms applied by international tribunals are entrenched
in international law.
184. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 290-91 n.29
(2003).
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According to Professor Antonio Cassese, this "implicit
acceptance through non-contestation would seem to evidence
the generally shared legal conviction that, where there are
serious and blatant breaches of universal values, national
courts are authorized to take action subject to fulfillment of
some fundamental requirements, such as ensuring a fair
trial.""' Canadian courts saw nothing wrong with litigation
against the mining conglomerate Talisman Energy.8 6  The
European Commission has also expressed cautious support
for ATS litigation so long as courts "rigorously apply
international law," and exercise universal civil jurisdiction
"only when the claimant would face a denial of justice in any
State that could exercise jurisdiction on a traditional basis,
such as territory or nationality.""' Indeed, most European
states "appear to countenance the principle of universal tort
jurisdiction under international law, and to limit themselves
to reminding the United States to remain reasonable in their
185. Id.
186. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Rybiak (2006) 215 O.A.C. 140, 33
C.P.C. (6th) 27, 275 D.L.R. (4th) 512 (Ont. C.A.), available at
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/search/en/OntarioCourtsSearchVOpe
nFile.cfm?serverFilePath=D%3A\Users\ Ontario%20Courts \www \decisions \2
006\september\C44057.htm) (agreeing with the lower court that "the foreign
request does not contravene the public policy of Canada. The diplomatic note
cannot be read as a statement of public policy requiring its dismissal.").
Canada's government, however, filed a brief urging the Second Circuit to
dismiss the case. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Government of Canada in
Support of Dismissal of the Underlying Action, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d. Cir. 2009) (No. 07-cv-0016). Canada's
argument was based on the assumption that the ATS is an exercise in
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. Id. at 10.
187. Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Commission in Support of Neither
Party at 4-5, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339) (Jan.
23, 2004), 2004 WL 177036. Compare Brief of the Commonwealth of Australia,
the Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 6, Sosa, 542
U.S. 692 (No. 03-339) (arguing that international law does not "recognize
universal civil jurisdiction for any category of cases at all, unless the relevant
states have consented to it in a treaty or it has been accepted in customary
international law"), with infra notes 196-211. More troubling are claims by the
United Kingdom that Apartheid litigation "infringes the sovereign rights of
States to regulate their citizens and matters within their territory." Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 20, Am. Isuzu
Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (No. 07-919). This conclusion is
premised on the faulty assumption that the "conduct is not alleged to have been
at variance with the domestic laws of South Africa or any other of the countries
concerned." Id. Under the ATS, courts apply customary international law.
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jurisdictional assertions."' Other states are following suit.
The government of South Africa, which opposed litigation for
apartheid era claims until very recently, has changed its
policy. 19 In a letter to the Southern District of New York,
South African Minister of Justice Thamsanqa Radebe
declared that the "Government of the Republic of South
Africa, having considered carefully the judgment of the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York
is now of the view that this Court is an appropriate forum to
hear the remaining claims of aiding and abetting in violation
of international law." 90 Even corporate defendants have
begun to accept the statute as a permanent feature of the
legal landscape. Just last year, two major corporations
agreed to settle significant ATS claims.' 9 '
There are, however, exceptions to the general trend of
188. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 126 (2008).
189. Letter from Jeffrey Thamsanqa Radebe, Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development, to Judge Shira Scheindlin, United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York (Sept. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.khulumani.net/attachments/343_RSA.Min.JusticeletterJ.Scheindl
in 09.01.09.PDF. The change in South African policy has led to a significant
turn in that of the United States. Compare Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 11, Balintulo v. Daimler AG, No. 09-
2778-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2009) ("The requirement of an explicit request for
dismissal on foreign policy grounds by the Executive Branch is, in our view,
critical. Although the Executive Branch informed the courts that these suits
could harm the United States' foreign relations, at no time in this litigation did
the United States seek dismissal on that basis."), with Brief of the United
States of America Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellees, at 5,
Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87317.pdf ("It would
be extraordinary to give U.S. law an extraterritorial effect in [these]
circumstances to regulate [the] conduct of a foreign state over its citizens, and
all the more so for a federal court to do so as a matter of common law-making
power. Yet plaintiffs would have this Court do exactly that by rendering private
defendants liable for the sovereign acts of the apartheid government of South
Africa."). This is the most significant evidence yet of a change in policy under
the Obama administration. It effectively undermines all Bush-era statements
of interest that did not "explicitly" seek dismissal.
190. See Letter from Radebe, supra note 189.
191. Pfizer agreed to pay $75 million. Shell reached a $15.5
million settlement. Ingrid Wuerth, Wiwa v. Shell: The $15.5 Million
Settlement, 13 ASIL INSIGHT, Sept. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.asil.org/files/insight090909pdf.pdf. Joe Stephens, Pfizer Reaches
Settlement in Nigerian Drug-Trial Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2009, at A3.
Other major settlements include: Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001)
(settled Mar. 21, 2005) and Wang Xiaoning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 07-2151 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (settled Nov. 13, 2007).
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non-contestation. Recently, in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, Lord
Hoffman noted in dicta that ATS cases are "contrary to
customary international law."192 Lord Hoffman's opinion
offers no support for this conclusion and generally betrays a
fundamental misunderstanding of the Alien Tort Statute.
This statute does not, for example, allow courts to circumvent
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. In Argentine Republic
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., which Lord Hoffman did not
cite, the Court held that "the FSIA provides the sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts."'
Scholars have also pointed out that Hoffman's sharp
distinction between civil and criminal proceedings has "no
basis in international law."194 A close reading of Jones does
not inspire confidence. It should not influence our
understanding of the ATS. Nor should it foreclose corporate
liability.
Finally, in evaluating this evidence of customary
international practice, scholars should recall Professor
Akehurst's axiom that: "[t]he acid test of the limits of
jurisdiction in international law is the presence or absence of
diplomatic protests."" No diplomatic protests have ever
been lodged in response to ATS litigation.
B. Conditional Universal Jurisdiction
The principle of conditional universal jurisdiction is
applicable to most alien tort claims and is a well-established
part of customary international law. 96  Even in S.S. Lotus,
192. Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Case
No. [2006] UKHL 26 (H.L. June 14, 2006), 1 99 available
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/1djudgmt/jd060614/jones.
pdf.
193. 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989).
194. For a careful demolition of Jones, see Brief of Professors of Public
International and Comparative Law at 29-34, 31 n.14, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130
S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555). According to Professor William Dodge, even if Jones
were an accurate statement of international law, it would "not necessarily be
applied as common law" because "sovereign immunity has long been treated as
a question of comity in the United States rather than as a question of customary
international law." William S. Dodge, Samantar Insta-Symposium: What
Samantar Doesn't Decide, OPINIO JURIS (Jun. 2, 2010, 8:42 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/02/samantar-insta-symposium-what-samantar-
doesn't-decide/.
195. Akehurst, supra note 182, at 176. See Sosa briefs, supra note 187.
196. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 338-339 (2d. ed.
2008) (distinguishing conditional universal jurisdiction from trial in absentia).
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considered by many the "high water mark of laissez-faire in
international relations,""' the Permanent Court of Justice
recognized that "[flar from laying down a general prohibition
to the effect that States may not extend the application of
their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory," international law
leaves states "a wide measure of discretion, which is only
limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules."e's The Court
reiterated that, "[i]n these circumstances, all that can be
required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits
which international law places upon its jurisdiction.""
Although some scholars have criticized this interpretation of
Lotus, the International Court of Justice has endorsed it.200
Universal jurisdiction is invoked where "there is no link of territoriality or
nationality between the State and the conduct or offender, nor is the State
seeking to protect its security or credit." Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (2003). In
contrast, conditional universal jurisdiction is based on contact with the forum.
In ATS litigation there are always "minimum contacts." See RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS supra note 178, § 421; infra note 391 (on the structural
safeguards of conditional universal jurisdiction). Simply put, criticisms of
universal jurisdictions are inapplicable to ATS litigation. For example, Judge
Guillaume's famous separate opinion criticizing universal jurisdiction was
limited to the exercise of this jurisdiction in absentia. Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 ICJ REP. 378 9, 12 (Feb. 14).
197. Arrest Warrant, supra note 196, 51 (joint sep. op. Higgins, J.,
Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J.)
198. S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept. 7).
See also REYDAMS, supra note 196, at 15 (arguing that international law
governs the area of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreigners and recognizes
multiple concurrent jurisdiction).
199. S.S. "Lotus," supra note 198, at 19.
200. Compare Vaughan Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW , supra
note 87, at 329, 335 ("[1It is extremely improbable that this is what the Court
meant to say."), with Declaration of President Bedjaoui, Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP. 226 at 290-91
(arguing that the "positivist, voluntarist approach of international law [found in
Lotus] . . . has been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a
law more readily seeking to reflect a collective juridical conscience and respond
to the social necessities of States organized as a community."), and Arrest
Warrant, supra note 196, T 51 (joint sep. op. Higgins, J., Kooijmans, J., and
Buergenthal, J.) ("[T]he international consensus that the perpetrators of
international crimes should not go unpunished is being advanced by a flexible
strategy, in which newly established international criminal tribunals, treaty
obligations and national courts all have their part to play. We reject the
suggestion that the battle against impunity is 'made over' to international
treaties and tribunals, with national courts having no competence in such
matters."). Even the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal acknowledges that there is "nothing in this case law which
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Critics contend that neither civil nor aiding and abetting
liability warrants the application of conditional universal
jurisdiction. 2 0 1 They are mistaken. First, there is no great
difference between asserting civil and criminal jurisdiction
over aliens. 2 02  As Professor Luc Reydams has noted, "if
universal criminal jurisdiction is permissible under
international law, universal civil jurisdiction is also
permissible."2 0 3 Indeed, in Ferrini v. Repubblica Federal di
Germania the Italian Court of Cassation held that "there is
no doubt that the principle of universal jurisdiction also
applies to civil actions."2 04 Second, international law dictates
that aiding and abetting liability is every bit as serious as
direct liability. In Prosecutor v. Tadi6, the Trial Chamber of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia noted:
[allthough only some members of the group may
physically perpetrate the criminal act ... the participation
and contribution of the other members of the group is
often vital in facilitating the commission of the offence in
question. It follows that the moral gravity of such
participation is often no less-or indeed no different-from
evidences an opinio juris on the illegality of such a jurisdiction. .. . There are,
moreover, certain indications that a universal criminal jurisdiction for certain
international crimes is clearly not regarded as unlawful." Id. IT 45-6.
For clarity's sake, it is necessary to underscore that this is not the
infamous Lotus principle. Instead, I have shown how a jurisdictional
presumption from that decision weathered the laissez-faire era of international
law and found new purpose in our own time. The actual Lotus principle-the
notion that "[riestrictions on the independence of States cannot . . . be
presumed"-finds no support in international law and remains highly
controversial. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ Rep. at 266. It also lies
squarely at odds with the fundamental principle of the Martens Clause.
201. Ramsey, supra note 97, at 294. Professor Julian Ku makes a similar
argument regarding corporate liability. Compare Ku, supra note 84, at 22, with
supra note 85.
202. Donald F. Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of
Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 153-157 (2006) (arguing
that universal jurisdiction encompasses a civil dimension). See also Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machian, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) ("[Clonsensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction
itself suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening.").
If anything, custom and practice suggest it is easier to assert universal civil
jurisdiction. See Akehurst, supra note 182, at 177.
203. REYDAMS, supra note 196, at 3.
204. (Cass. Mar. 11, 2004) (Sez. Un.) published in 87 RISTA DI DIRITTo
INTERNAZIONALE 539, 546 (2004) ("[N]on si dubita che il principio della
universalitA della giurisdizione valga anche per i processi civili che traggono
origine da tali reati.").
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that of those actually carrying out the acts in question. 205
Professor Gerhard Werle has shown that this is a well-
established principle of international law. "It must be kept in
mind," he warns, "that the degree of criminal responsibility
does not diminish as distance from the actual act
increases."20 6 Further undermining critics of ATS litigation is
the evolution of international law toward a common set of
standards for international civil liability.207
C. An Emerging Consensus
The emerging consensus toward local remedies for torts
in violation of international law indicates that federal courts
will not run afoul of international law or the Charming Betsy
doctrine,2 08 so long as the standards of substantive federal
common law are those established in customary international
law. 20 9 As Judge Scheindlin has noted, the ATS
applies universal norms that forbid conduct regardless of
territorial demarcations or sovereign prerogatives.
Therefore, unlike the application of specific rules
formulated by American legislators or jurists, the
adjudication of tort claims stemming from acts committed
abroad will not generate conflicting legal obligations, and
there is a substantially reduced likelihood that
adjudication will legitimately offend the sovereignty of
205. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
191 (July 15, 1999).
206. GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 117
(2005). See also Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 767, 781
(2002) (noting the prevalence of the unitary model of complicity in international
criminal law which holds that actors and accomplices are indistinguishable
from perpetrators).
207. Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic
Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention, 42 HARv. INT'L L.J. 141 (2001).
208. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("[An act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains.").
209. See U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law
Commission, Fifty-Eighth Session, Supp. No. 10, Annex E, at 520-23, U.N. Doc.
A/61/10 (Aug. 11, 2006) ("A State's application of foreign law or international
law rather than its own national law would therefore be excluded from the
scope of this topic since these situations would not constitute the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by a State in relation to its national law based on its
national interests.").
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foreign nations. 210
This comports with the finding of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v.
Furundfija that "the victim could bring a civil suit for
damage in a foreign court."211  Domestic courts may apply
domestic remedies and local ancillary rules of decision, but
must seek out international standards.2 12 As Professor
William Casto recognizes, if "international law clearly
obligates the United States to apply a particular rule of
decision in private litigation, the courts-absent unusual
circumstances [namely an act of Congress 21 3 -should apply
the obligatory rule."21 4 Fortunately, the international
standard for direct violation of international law is
undisputed.215 Deducing the standards for aiding and
abetting is a good deal more complicated.
IV. THE CHOICE OF LAWS DILEMMA FOR THE SOURCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE LAW UNDER THE ATS
The courts apply two different-yet nearly identical 216 -
standards of aiding and abetting liability. The more
210. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
2009). See also Casto, supra note 3, at 643 ("When a court elaborates upon the
existence and scope of the norm that is being enforced, the court is not engaging
in judicial lawmaking. Rather, the court is simply discovering or expounding
norms that already exist in international law.").
211. Prosecutor v. Furundfija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T Trial, Judgment, 155
(Dec. 10, 1998).
212. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[Clourts must look to international law to determine
the relevant substantive law.").
213. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) ("If it be the will of
the government to apply to Spain any rule respecting captures which Spain is
supposed to apply to us, the government will manifest that will be passing an
act for the purpose. Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law of
nations which is a part of the law of the land.").
214. Casto, supra note 3, at 643. See also Dodge, supra note 179, at 37
("Courts do not apply U.S. substantive law in ATS cases; they apply customary
international law."); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 178, §
421 (federal court should consider international jurisdictional principles); see
infra notes 238-43.
215. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 76, at 204-07.
216. The standard found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b)
(1979) that an individual is liable for aiding and abetting "if he . .. knows that
the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other" is exactly the same as the international
standard found in customary international law.
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traditional standard is based on domestic federal common
law. The other standard originated at Nuremberg and has
been applied by international ad hoc tribunals. The choice of
law problem first arose in Doe v. Unocal, and judges have
grappled over which standard to apply ever since.2 17 The
Second Circuit decision in Khulumani,2 18 which netted three
different interpretations, is a prime example. Failing to
reach a consensus, the court decided to leave the task of
determining "whether international or domestic federal
common law is the exclusive source from which to derive the
applicable standard" to a future panel of the court.2 1 9 Any
future Supreme Court decision on the ATS should address
this problem.
This choice of laws problem seems illusory, yet the
problem returns to plague federal courts, cropping up even in
the best-reasoned opinions. For instance, in the most recent
decision in the South African Apartheid Litigation line of
cases, Judge Scheindlin acknowledged that "[a]lthough cases
in this Circuit have only required consultation of the law of
nations concerning the existence of substantive offenses, the
language and logic of Sosa require that this Court turn to
customary international law to ascertain the contours of
secondary liability as well."22 0 This is true enough. Only a
few pages later, however, after having explained that
"vicarious liability is clearly established under customary
international law, obviating any concerns regarding
universality," Judge Scheindlin held that because "the
international law of agency has not developed precise
standards for this Court to apply in the civil context" it makes
more sense to apply "federal common law principles
concerning agency. "221
217. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). An out of court settlement
in that case foreclosed an en banc review of the question.
218. 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
219. Id. at 286 n.38 (Hall, J. concurring).
220. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (adding "as the [ATS] is merely a jurisdictional vehicle for the
enforcement of universal norms, the contours of secondary liability must stem
from international sources."). Id. at 256. But see Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 284
(Hall, J., concurring) ("As Sosa makes clear, a federal court must turn to
international law to divine standards of primary liability under the[ATS]. To
derive a standard of accessorial liability, however, a federal court should consult
the federal common law.").
221. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
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The choice of law problem facing ATS litigation is illusory
because the rules of decision are straightforward: "courts
must look to international law to determine the relevant
substantive law."2 22  Federal common law may then be
applied interstitially to resolve ancillary issues. The choice-
of-law debate turns on whether the aiding and abetting
conduct regulated by law is substantive or ancillary.
Professor Casto has persuasively argued that "Sosa held that
in ATS litigation the norm regulating conduct must be found
by the federal courts in international law. Other rules of
decision that are not conduct-regulating norms are to be
legislated by the courts as ordinary federal common law."223
This age-old principle can even be found in the writings of
James Wilson: "[e]ach nation owes to every other the duties of
humanity. It is true, there may be some difference in the
application, in this as well as in other instances: but the
principles of the application are the same."224 As with
corporate liability, the root of the problem is not a lack of
clear standards in international law. Rather, lacking a clear
roadmap the courts take the familiar path of least resistance.
As Judge Hall admitted in Khulumani: "lacking the benefit of
clear guidance, I presume a federal court should resort to its
traditional source, the federal common law, when deriving
the standard."225
A. The Limits of the Federal Common Law Approach
Courts have a wealth of history, tradition, and precedent
at their disposal to apply in adjudicating federal aiding and
abetting claims. Aiding and abetting liability has long been
part of our common law and predates the ATS. Blackstone's
Commentaries warn that "breaking of truce and safe-
conducts, or abetting and receiving the truce-breakers, was
(in affirmance and support of the laws of nations) declared to
be high treason. "226 "Cases from that era," the Second Circuit
noted in Khulumani, "indicate that secondary liability was
recognized as an established part of the federal common
222. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasis added).
223. Casto, supra note 3, at 695.
224. Wilson, supra note 23, at 148.
225. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 286.
226. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, *69.
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law."227 Drawing on the law of nations, Judge Wilson charged
the grand jury in Henfield's Case that those "who commit, aid,
or abet hostilities against these powers . . . offend against the
laws of the United States, and ought to be punished."2 2 8 The
earliest reference to this theory of liability in conjunction with
the Alien Tort Statute arises from the Republic's early
attempts to maintain strict neutrality. In 1795, Attorney
General William Bradford warned Americans they could be
liable under the Alien Tort Statute if they "voluntarily joined,
conducted, aided, and abetted a French fleet in attacking the
settlement, and plundering or destroying the property of
British subjects on that coast."2 29 Citing an earlier
declaration by President Washington, he reiterated his
warning to "those who should render themselves liable to
punishment under the laws of nations, by committing, aiding,
or abetting hostilities against any of the said parties."2 3 0
That same year, in Talbot v. Jansen, the Court held a
Frenchman liable under the law of nations for aiding and
abetting an American's unlawful capture of a neutral vessel
in wartime.2 3 ' Justice Paterson held that Talbot, the
Frenchman, was not "warranted in seducing the citizens of
neutral nations from their duty, and assisting them in
committing depredations upon friendly powers."23 2 Despite
knowing that the American "had no commission," Talbot
armed the ship with guns and performed an "essential part of
the outfit."23 3  Even at this early date, the two prongs of
227. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 288 n.5. The Second Circuit has ably
dispatched claims that Sosa counsels against recognizing aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS. But see Bradley et al., supra note 7, at 926-27. The
Revisionist interpretation of Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), has also been thoroughly dismantled by Nilay
Vora, infra note 237, at 217-19.
228. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360). See
also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
("The liability of private actors, as aiders and abettors, for violations of
international law was understood at the time the ATS was enacted.").
229. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795) (adding "there can
be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by these
acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States;
jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien
sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations"). Id. at 59.
230. Id.
231. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
232. Id. at 156.
233. Id.
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aiding and abetting analysis-knowledge and substantial
assistance-were apparent. Aiding and abetting liability was
formally codified as § 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and the leading case on the subject today is Halberstam v.
Welch.234
Advocates of the federal common law approach, like
Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit, argue that third-party
liability "is a straightforward legal matter that federal courts
routinely resolve using common law principles."2 35  These
principles, he argues, "provide the traditional and time-tested
method of filling in the interstices and resolving the type of
ancillary legal questions presented by this case."23 6 Many
scholars and students agree.2 37 Yet none of these accounts
successfully explain why third-party liability is an ancillary
legal question. Aiding and abetting liability also constitutes
substantive customary international law. Like Judge
Reinhardt, the most articulate champions of the federal
common law approach know full well that courts must apply
international law when it plays a substantive role."3
Domestic law may supply the rules so long as they match
international standards, but given that there is no evidence
234. 705 F.2d 472, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Courts follow Texas Indus., Inc.
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (recognizing that
"international disputes implicating . .. our relations with foreign nations" are
one of the "narrow areas" in which federal common law continues to exist).
235. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 966 (9th Cir. 2002).
236. Id.
237. Ingrid B. Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law-A
New Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin? abstract_id=1563455. Nilay Vora, Note,
Federal Common Law and Alien Tort Statute Litigation: Why Federal Common
Law Can (and Should) Provide Aiding and Abetting Liability, 50 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 195, 199 (2009) ("[Tlhere might be salient reasons that federal common law,
and not international law, should provide these rules of decision."); Daniel
Diskin, Note, The Historical and Modern Foundations for Aiding and Abetting
Liability under the Alien Tort Statute, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 810 (2005)
("[D]omestic law should inform the calculus of when a defendant may be held
civilly liable based on an aiding and abetting theory pursuant to the ATS.").
238. See Vora, supra note 237, at 196. Even Judge Reinhardt acknowledges,
"international law applies to the substantive violation." Unocal, 395 F.3d at
966. Vora cites to the proposition that "international law in turn says that such
liability rules can be supplied by domestic law." Vora, supra note 237, at 217
n.107 (citing Comment, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1953, 1960 (2008)). This approach
ignores that courts must apply international law where it provides a clear
standard for the norm regulating conduct. See supra notes 212-14 and infra
notes 239-43 and accompanying text. Thus, Vora's plea for federal common law
rules of decision ultimately collapses into a circular argument.
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that they will continue to do so, courts should consistently
apply international law. To comport with international law
and rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction, the ATS must be
governed by international standards whenever they are
available.
Much of the aversion to international law standards is
grounded in a misunderstanding of international law. For
example, in praising the "the vast experience embodied in
federal common law" Judge Reinhardt errs in comparing it to
what he calls "an undeveloped principle of international law
promulgated by a recently-constituted ad hoc international
tribunal."23 9 The next Section will show that the knowledge
standard, far from being a "nascent criminal law doctrine
recently adopted by an ad hoc criminal tribunal,"24 0 has been
a feature of international law for decades. Judge Reinhardt's
preference for federal common law as the better-defined body
of precedent is mistaken. It also runs afoul of the
jurisdictional constraints on the application of domestic
substantive law to foreign corporations. As the Southern
District of Indiana recently noted, the ATS "does not provide
an invitation to apply substantive domestic United States law
to activity throughout the world."2 4 ' Under international law
"U.S. Courts are not permitted to create common law liability
for non-U.S. conduct of foreign defendants merely on the
basis of U.S. domestic regulatory standards."2 42 The
operating word here is merely. Had Judges Reinhardt and
Hall accounted for international standards nothing would
have precluded federal common law application of local
remedies. The Court should have looked at international law
first:
[w]here federal law does not provide a clear rule, the
courts borrow from analogous federal or even state rules,
as appropriate, to answer ancillary issues. Here, a court
might ask first whether international law provides a clear
answer, then look to federal vicarious liability standards
239. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 967.
240. But see RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 178, §
103(2)(a) & cmt. b. ("[T]o the extent that decisions of international tribunals
adjudicate questions of international law, they are persuasive evidence of what
the law is.").
241. Keitner, supra note 55, at 65 n.12 (citing Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., No.
1:06-cv-0627-DFH-JMS, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 53148, at *7-8 (S.D. Ind. 2008)).
242. Ramsey, supra note 97, at 302.
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as necessary to fill any gaps.243
The municipal law that enforces international law must be
consistent with international law. Ideally courts would
"apply the uniform rules of federal common law derived from
international and federal law."2" This federal common law,
however, "should not be construed based on the whims of
judges, but rather should be based on established federal and
international legal precedent. This method furthers the
federal and international values of uniformity, predictability,
and consistency."2 4 5
B. The Virtues of the International Law Approach
Identifying which body of international law governs
aiding and abetting liability is a secondary problem in the
choice-of-laws debate. The standards set out at Nuremberg
are manageable and represent the current status of
international law. Even critics of ATS litigation acknowledge
that "the concept of criminal aiding and abetting liability is
well established" in international law.24 6  After reviewing
"international law's treatment of aiding and abetting liability
over the past sixty years" Judge Katzmann concluded "that
aiding and abetting liability . . . is sufficiently 'well-
established [] [and] universally recognized' to be considered
customary international law for the purposes of the [ATS]." 247
243. Stephens, supra note 46, at 560 (emphasis added).
244. Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal
Common Law and Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26
LOY. L.A. INTL'L & COMP. L. REV. 47,66 (2003).
245. Id. at 49.
246. Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Defendant-Appellees at 21, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d
254 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-2141-cv, 05-2326-cv). This concession by the Bush
Administration was tempered by its simultaneous attempt to rehabilitate the
discredited thesis that unless international law provides a "specific private right
to redress" there is no equivalent cause of action under ATS. This argument
was resoundingly rejected in Sosa. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724
(2004). The non-existence of an international law of torts does not imply the
non-existence of domestic remedies. This argument was reprised in In Re S.
Africa Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (arguing that
ATS "does not provide for aider and abettor liability, and this Court will not
write it into the statute. In refusing to do so, this Court finds this approach to
be heedful of the admonition in Sosa that Congress should be deferred to with
respect to innovative interpretations of that statute") which was reversed and
remanded. Judge Scheidlin has since correctly rejected this line of argument.
247. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat.'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citing Kadic v. Karadik, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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He also recognized the "individual responsibility of a
defendant who aids and abets a violation of international law
is one of those rules 'that States universally abide by, or
accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual
concern,"' but nevertheless went on to cite the Rome Statute
as though it reflects customary international law.2 48 The
Court must review and correct this common misapplication of
the law.
The standard for aiding and abetting emerged at
Nuremberg, not in the jurisprudence of a nascent ad hoc
tribunal, as Judge Reinhardt has claimed.249 Control Council
Law No. 10 states that a person
is deemed to have committed a crime . . . if he was (a) a
principle or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any
such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a
consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or
enterprises involving its commission. 250
The Nuremberg standard for mens rea required "knowledge
that these acts assist the commission of the offence."25 1 In the
Flick trial, the tribunal held that "[olne who knowingly by his
influence and money contributes to support thereof must,
under settled legal principles, be deemed to be, if not a
principal, certainly an accessory to such crimes." 252  This
standard was applied in numerous cases against corporate
officers.2 53 It has not been supplanted by the purposefulness
standard set out in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute.2 5 4
The Rome Statute itself rejects such reliance in Article 10 and
does not pretend to be customary international law. 5
248. Id. at 270.
249. See supra text accompanying note 235.
250. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes against Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 1945).
251. Prosecutor v. Furundlija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber
Judgment, [ 249 (Dec. 10, 1998).
252. 6 T.W.C., supra note 71, 1217.
253. In addition to the Nuremberg cases I have cited so far see In re Tesch &
Others (Zyklon B Case) (British Mil. Ct. 1946), in 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N,
LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 101 (1947) (holding that the
two industrialists "knew that the gas was to be used for the purpose of killing
human beings").
254. Article 25(d) plainly does not adopt a purpose standard. Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002).
255. See supra note 92; see also Brief of David J. Scheffer, at 3, Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d. Cir. 2009) (No. 07-
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Indeed, as Professor Robert Cryer has pointed out, Article
25(3)(c) neither reflects nor sets out customary international
law: the article "introduces a purposive, motive requirement
that is not required by custom (under which knowledge
suffices). Thus the crime is not defined in accordance with
customary international law, but in practice the addition of
the purposive intent will render liability under the Rome
Statute more narrowly than in custom." 256 The Rome Statute
does not supplant existing norms of customary international
law and must be construed to conform to established norms.
According to Judge Scheindlin, there is "no explicit deviation
in the Rome Statute with regard to aiding and abetting
liability. Article 25(c) can be reasonably interpreted to
conform to pre-Rome Statute customary international law."257
Despite the wealth of case law from the Nuremberg era,
Judge Katzmann focused entirely on one rather exceptional
aspect of the Ministries case to establish a purposive
requirement.258 Here the tribunal refused to impose criminal
liability on a bank officer who "made loans and payments to
and collected money from the SS knowing that the purpose
was to purchase 'aryanized' property extorted all over
Europe" reasoning against much evidence to the contrary that
"banks and bankers are mere cut-outs, ciphers who bundle
money from investors and pass it along to borrowers and are
not responsible for what the borrower does with the
money."259 The tribunal rejected "the proposition that the
official of a loaning bank is chargeable with the illegal
operations alleged to have resulted from loans or which may
have been contemplated by the borrower."260 Mens rea,
however, was not pivotal in Rashe's exoneration.2 6 ' As Judge
0016-cv) (noting that Art. 25(3) "was not finalized to express a rule of customary
international law").
256. Robert Cryer, The Boundaries of Liability in International Criminal
Law, or 'Selectivity by Stealth', 6 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3 (2001). See also
WERLE, supra note 206, at 127 (arguing that "[knowledge of the primary
perpetrator's intent is sufficient").
257. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 261 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
258. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat.'1 Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 276 (2d Cir.
2007).
259. Bush, supra note 65, at 1221-22.
260. 14 T.W.C., supra note 71, 854.
261. But see Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 254 (erroneously reading a purpose
requirement).
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Scheindlin insightfully noted,
the acquittal did not rest on the absence of criminal
intent. The Tribunal never discussed whether facilitation
of a loan with express intent to further the crimes of the
S.S. would create criminal liability, indicating that the
mens rea was not pivotal. Rather, the Tribunal focused on
the nature of the act, stating, "[W]e are not prepared to
state that such loans constitute a violation of that law." In
other words, the Tribunal acquitted Rasche for not having
met the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting.
Moreover, with regard to different defendants in the same
case, the Tribunal stated, "The question is whether they
knew of the program and whether in any substantial
manner they aided, abetted, or implemented it." Thus the
Ministries case does not deviate from the standard mens
rea requirement found in customary international law. 262
This well-reasoned piece of judicial craftsmanship is the
proper approach to the Ministries case. This interpretation of
Ministries succeeds in reconciling the case of Rasche with
that of Emil Puhl, a deputy to the President of the German
Reichsbank, who was found guilty of knowingly disposing
looted goods "even though [according to the Court] he
apparently did not share the intent of the Nazi perpetrators
and in all likelihood found their actions 'repugnant.'"
26 3
Unfortunately, Judge Scheindlin's correct application of
international law is now considered bad law thanks to the
Second Circuit's decision in Talisman Energy, which held that
"international law at the time of the Nuremberg trials
recognized aiding and abetting liability only for purposeful
conduct."264  Recognizing that in Khulumani the Second
Circuit had "fractured as to the standard for pleading [aiding
and abetting] liability," Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs held that
"under international law, a claimant must show that the
262. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 260. See also
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, [ 545
(Sept. 2, 1998) ("[An accused is liable as an accomplice to genocide if he
knowingly aided or abetted or instigated one or more persons in the commission
of genocide, while knowing that such a person or persons were committing
genocide, even though the accused himself did not have the specific intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such.").
263. Keitner, supra note 55, at 91 (citing 14 T.W.C., supra note 71, 620).
264. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
259 (2d. Cir. 2009).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
defendant provided substantial assistance with the purpose of
facilitating the alleged offenses."26 5 Although the Sudanese
government violated customary international law, there was
"no evidence that Talisman acted with the purpose to support
the Government's offenses."* Judge Jacobs asserted that
the "purpose standard has been largely upheld in the modern
era, with only sporadic forays in the direction of a knowledge
standard."2 67 This too is false.
The ad hoc tribunals established for Rwanda and the
Former Yugoslavia during the 1990s have consistently
applied the Nuremberg knowledge standard. In Furundlija,
the Trial Chamber held that "it is not necessary for the
accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the
sense of positive intention to commit the crime."26 8
Awareness of the crime would suffice. 2 69 The Trial Chamber
set out the "legal ingredients" for aiding and abetting in
international criminal law as mens rea that is "knowledge
that these acts assist the commission of the offence."27 0 These
standards were reiterated in Vasiljevi6 where the Trial
Chamber underscored that while the "aider and abettor must
be aware of the essential elements of the crime" he "need not
share the intent of the principal offender."2 7' The ad hoc
tribunals regarded the norm against aiding and abetting as a
substantive part of international law. One important case
held that "prosecutions following the Second World War
confirm" that the "concept of direct individual criminal
responsibility and personal culpability for assisting, aiding
and abetting . . . has a basis in customary international
law."272 In Khulumani, Judge Katzmann argued that "those
265. Id. at 247.
266. Id. at 263.
267. Id. at 259.
268. Prosecutor v. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T Trial Chamber
Judgment 1 245 (Dec. 10, 1998) ("[Tlhe clear requirement in the vast majority of
the [Nuremberg-era] cases is for the accomplice to have knowledge that his
actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.").
269. Id. 235 (adding, for example "in the Einsatzgruppen case knowledge,
rather than intent, was held to be the requisite mental element. The same
position was taken in Zyklon B where the prosecution did not attempt to prove
that the accused acted with the intention of assisting the killing of the
internees.").
270. Id. 249, 252.
271. Prosecutor v. Vasiljevid, Case No. IT-98-32-T 71 (Nov. 29, 2002).
272. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, I
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who assist in the commission of a crime with the purpose of
facilitating that crime would be subject to aiding and abetting
liability under the statutes governing the ICTY and ICTR."2 7 3
While this is correct, it is also misleading. These tribunals
have also repeatedly held those who knowingly aid and abet
the commission of a crime liable. The mens rea for aiding and
abetting under customary international law is not the
purpose standard, as Judge Katzmann claims. 274  Federal
courts have had no trouble applying the correct international
standard. Citing Furundiija, Judge Pregerson correctly held
in Unocal that "it is not necessary for the accomplice to share
the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the sense of positive
intention to commit the crime," but merely that the defendant
"is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be
committed."275
In choosing to rely on the Rome Statute, Judge Jacobs
not only applied the wrong body of international law, but he
did so incorrectly. The Rome Statute does not unequivocally
adopt the purpose standard for all forms of aiding and
abetting. Article 25(d) sanctions a person who "[imn any other
way contributes to the commission or attempted commission
of ... a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose" if it is "made with the aim of furthering the criminal
activity or criminal purpose" or "the knowledge of the
intention of the group to commit the crime. "276 Professor
Andrew Clapham has persuasively argued that "no 'purpose'
is required by the person assisting. The Statute simply
requires 'knowledge of the intention of the group.'" 2 7 7 Indeed,
the "absence of practice based on the 25(3)(c) assistance test"
points courts to the standards of customary international law
as they were clarified at Nuremberg and by the ICTY and
ICTR ad hoc tribunals. 27 8
Not surprisingly, the most exemplary application of
666 (May 7, 1997).
273. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 276 (2d Cir. 2007).
274. Id. at 277.
275. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 950, 956 (9th Cir. 2002).
276. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) (emphasis added).
277. Andrew Clapham, Extending International Criminal Law beyond the
Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups, 6 J. INTL CRIM.
JUST. 899, 908 (2008).
278. Id.
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international law can be found in Judge Scheindlin's opinion
for Apartheid Litigation. Noting that the Second Circuit
court in Khulumani had "left this court without a standard to
apply or even a decision concerning the source of law from
which this court should derive a standard,"27 9 Judge
Scheindlin correctly stated that international law "requires
that an aider and abettor know that its actions will
substantially assist the perpetrator in the commission of a
crime or tort in violation of the law of nations."28 0  The
requirement is mere knowledge, and the firms in question
simply had to know that their products would be used for
human rights violations for liability to attach.281
Several district courts have incorrectly applied the more
stringent Rome Statute standard and will continue to do so
until the Supreme Court clarifies the binding nature of the
customary international law standard.28 2 Similarly, courts
will continue to disagree about whether private individuals
can be liable under international law, ignoring the fact that
the Alien Tort Statute was created specifically to deal with
private liability.2 83
V. THE MISSED OPPORTUNITY: PFIZER V. ABDULLAHI
Pfizer v. Abdullahi would have served as an excellent
point of entry to the question of corporate liability under the
Alien Tort Statute. Unlike most other cases, it did not appear
to implicate state action and it was therefore unencumbered
by the controversial ancillary debates over the political
279. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 255 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
280. Id. at 262.
281. See U.N Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and
Human Rights: Further Steps toward the Optionalization of the "Protect, Respect
and Remedy" Framework, 74 n.43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010)
("The weight of international legal opinion suggests that the relevant standard
is knowingly providing practical assistance or encouragement that has a
substantial effect on the commission of a crime.") (citing U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16);
Van Anraat, Rechtsbank [Rb.] Gravenhage [District Court of the Hague], 6.5.1,
Dec. 23 2005, LJN AU8685 (Neth.) (adhering to the international legal standard
which requires knowledge on the part of the accomplice for international
crimes), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/4/497.html.
282. Doe v. Drummond Co., No. 09-cv-01041, slip op. at 21 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 9,
2009); Abecassis v. Wyatt, No. H-09-3884, 2010 WL 1286871, at *27 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 2010).
283. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
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question doctrine and state immunity. Had the Court
granted certiorari, it would have also been able to address
which body of law governs corporate aiding and abetting
liability. In short, the Court would have had the opportunity
to address all of the core issues analyzed in this Article:
corporate liability, jurisdictional compatibility, and the source
of substantive law for aiding and abetting liability. Since the
Court will return to these recurring issues in future cases, it
is worth examining closely the arguments made in the
certiorari briefs.
In 1996, the Nigerian city of Kano was plagued by an
epidemic of bacterial meningitis that would eventually kill
over twelve thousand people. Pfizer took advantage of this
tragedy and conducted a large-scale study of an experimental
antibiotic, Trovan, on some of the sick children. It allegedly
acted without obtaining informed consent from guardians,
modifying treatments when conditions worsened, or
disclosing the immediate availability of proven and effective
treatment from Mddecins sans Frontiares at the same
hospital.2 84 According to the plaintiffs, "the tests caused the
deaths of eleven children, five of whom had taken Trovan and
six of whom had taken the lowered dose of ceftriaxone, and
left many others blind, deaf, paralyzed, or brain-damaged."285
The Nigerian government allegedly facilitated this test by
granting Pfizer control over two wards in the Infectious
Disease Hospital in Kano and the right to import Trovan into
the country.286 An exposd of the tests was ultimately
published in the Washington Post.28 7 Shortly thereafter,
families of the victims filed several claims under the ATS
against Pfizer. Most of these claims were dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS and on the
ground of forum non conveniens.28 8 On July 12, 2007,
however, a consolidated appeal of these cases from the
284. Brief in Opposition, at 2 Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct 3541 (2010)
(No. 09-34), 2009 WL 2473875.
285. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs
alleged that subjects received only one-third of the recommended dose of the
control drug ceftriaxone in order to make Trovan seem more effective. Id.
286. Id. at 188.
287. Joe Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in the Balance, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at Al, available at http:l/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contentlarticle/2007/07/02/AR2007070201255.html.
288. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 170.
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Southern District of New York made it before the Second
Circuit.289 The plaintiffs alleged that Pfizer had violated
customary international law.2 90 Failure to obtain informed
consent is a breach of the Nuremberg Code and several
postwar treaties. 9 ' The Second Circuit held that
nonconsensual human medical experimentation violates a
specific and universal norm of customary international law
that can be enforced through the ATS. 2  In short, the
Nuremberg Code satisfied the requirements set out in Sosa
for a norm that is actionable under the Alien Tort Statute.29 3
Pfizer appealed to the Supreme Court in a brief authored
by Professor Kathleen Sullivan.294 In the petition for
certiorari, Professor Sullivan argued that there "is no general
international common law of torts" and the only way to
establish subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS for a
violation of international law is by showing that "a private
corporation or individual . . . acted under color of law or in
concert with a foreign government."2 95 Sullivan claimed a
circuit split existed regarding state action and that the
Second Circuit incorrectly allowed plaintiffs "to proceed with
their ATS claims despite their failure to allege that the
Nigerian government knew of or participated in the specific
conduct by Pfizer that is claimed to violate international
law." 29 6  This claim was controversial because, to date, no
federal court has recognized a circuit split on the subject.
Next, she cited the Ninth Circuit decision in Abagninin,
289. Id. at 168.
290. Id. at 170.
291. The treaties include the Geneva Convention, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Declaration of Helsinki, and the United Nations'
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Joe Stephens, Panel Faults
Pfizer in '96 Clinical Trial in Nigeria, WASH. POST, MAY 7,
2006, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contentlarticle/2006/05/06/AR2006050601338.html.
292. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169.
293. Id. at 184-85. The Court endorsed the conclusions of the American
tribunal that tried Nazi doctors: "the American tribunal's conclusion that action
that contravened the Code's first principle constituted a crime against humanity
is a lucid indication of the international legal significance of the prohibition on
nonconsensual medical experimentation." Id. at 179. Medical atrocities also
constitute war crimes when committed during war.
294. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct. 3541
(2009) (No. 09-34), 2009 WL 2173302.
295. Id. at 12-13. On the limited color of law requirement see supra note 55.
296. Id. at 14.
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which employed a heightened state action requirement.2 9 7
Thus, Sullivan exploited the misapplication of the Rome
Statute in that case to allege a circuit split.2 8 Finally, with a
creative use of ellipsis Sullivan argued that "[blecause the
law of nations typically binds nation states, not private
actors, ATS jurisdiction must be especially sparing when 'the
perpetrator being sued . . . is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual."' 29 9 Sullivan's claim about the law
of nations finds no support in footnote twenty or any other
part of the Sosa. opinion. The remark appeared as dicta in a
passage on the importance of the clear definition
requirement. The majority simply noted that: "[a] related
consideration is whether international law extends the scope
of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator
being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual."00
Sullivan distinguished Pfizer v. Abdullahi from the
Nuremberg-era Medical Case by noting that the latter's
conduct was intertwined with the government. The Second
Circuit nonetheless "held that Pfizer is bound by the
Nuremberg Code principle that '[t]he voluntary consent of the
human subject is absolutely essential,' even though that
principle was announced as a result of criminal verdicts
against state actors who were part of the governmental
machinery of the Third Reich."30 ' Opponents of ATS
litigation point out that Pfizer's drug testing in the midst of a
health crisis with the support of the Nigerian government is
dissimilar from the medical experiments committed by the
Nazis on prisoners.2 While perhaps intuitively compelling,
this criticism suffers from the fact that following Sosa, courts
are supposed to look to the international norm, not the
297. Id. at 16.
298. Id. at 19. But see Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12,
Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2009) (No. 09-34), 2009 WL 2173302
(noting that "the Ninth Circuit's state-action discussion in Abagninin was not a
general conclusion that any ATS claim must satisfy a state 'plan-or-policy
test'").
299. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 294, at 20 (citing Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)).
300. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
301. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 294, at 6.
302. Letter from Professor Curtis A. Bradley to author (Dec. 30, 2009) (on file
with author).
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precise fact pattern from which the norm emerged."0 The
standard is encapsulated in the Nuremberg Code, rather than
in characteristics of Nazi medical experiments. Courts should
determine whether the Code refers purely to action taken in
the furtherance of a war crime or to all medical
experimentation on humans. Unfortunately, there is no clear
answer to either of these questions.3 04
The Plaintiffs replied in a brief authored by Professor
Arthur Miller. He argued that there is no circuit split and
that state action is not required under international law. 0
The Second Circuit's decision, he reasoned, "in no way
expands the concept of state actor under the ATS."30 6 With
respect to the cause of action, Professor Miller noted "[tlhere
is no real question that nonconsensual medical
experimentation violates specifically defined international
norms." 307  Not only is voluntary consent of the human
subject "absolutely essential" but the "Nuremberg Code
expressly emphasizes this principle's applicability to private
actors."0 8 Indeed, the text explicitly states the "duty and
responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the
experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which
may not be delegated to another with impunity."'3  Even if
this argument were to fail, Miller noted that the "[the lower
courts] found that Respondents adequately pled that the
Nigerian government and Pfizer were 'joint participants' in
the Trovan experiment."31 0 He concluded by reiterating that
"state action is not required to sustain a claim under the
303. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729; see also supra note 53.
304. See GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND
THE NUREMBERG CODE (1992). In such circumstances the lower courts would be
wise to exercise restraint.
305. Brief in Opposition, supra note 284, at 7, 12.
306. Id. at 9.
307. Id. at 1. Professor Miller stated that "Pfizer [did] not argue that consent
was not required, but instead attempts to characterize its conduct as a mere
technical failure in obtaining consent." Id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 294, at 23). "Such mischaracterization obscures Pfizer's violations of
basic human rights principles governing that conduct, with or without the
presence of state action." Id.
308. Id. at 3 (citing United States v. Brandt ("The Medical Case"), in 2
T.W.C., supra note 71, at 181-82).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 7.
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ATS."311
On May 28, 2010, the Solicitor General submitted a brief
recommending a denial of certiorari. The government argued
that the lower court did not depart in its ruling from any
other circuit.312 The brief failed, however, to endorse
Professor Miller's primary reading of the decision. Instead, it
argued that the Second Circuit allowed the plaintiffs claims
to proceed on the basis of the Nigerian government's alleged
participation in the Trovan test.3 13 It acknowledged that the
Second Circuit "did not mention any allegation of specific
knowledge on the part of the [Nigerian] government of the
allegedly nonconsensual nature of the test."31 4 Nevertheless,
it argued that the majority in Abdullahi v. Pfizer "did not
affirmatively hold that state action, or liability in actions
under the ATS more generally, can be proved in the absence
of such knowledge or participation in the alleged acts."3 15
Suffice it to say that this was an exceedingly cautious reading
of the decision. The Government concluded that no further
review of the question was necessary because Pfizer did not
challenge the Second Circuit's conclusion that international
law prohibits nonconsensual medical testing when there is
state involvement and the Supreme Court should not be the
first to decide whether the ATS allows a claim about
nonconsensual medical testing in the absence of state
action.1 6
On June 29, 2010, following the advice of the Solicitor
General, the Court denied certiorari and missed a prime
opportunity to clarify the law."
311. Brief in Opposition, supra note 284, at 12 ("[Tlhis Court in Sosa clearly
contemplated international norms reaching private actors . . . [i]ndeed
Petitioner has not cited a single circuit court decision holding that state action
is required to state a claim under the ATS. This is because there is no such
requirement.").
312. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi,
130 S. Ct. 3541 (May 28, 2010) (No. 09-34), 2002 WL 2214874.
313. Id. at 10.
314. Id. at 11.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 14.
317. Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
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VI. THE TEST CASE: PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SUDAN V.
TALISmAN ENERGY
The Court's next opportunity to examine corporate aiding
and abetting liability was Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy."'8 The preliminary briefs suggested the
Court would have had the opportunity to address all of the
core issues analyzed in this Article: corporate liability,
jurisdictional compatibility, and the source of substantive law
for aiding and abetting liability.
In 1998, Talisman Energy entered into a joint venture
with the government of Sudan to develop oil and gas reserves
in its southern province.3 1 9 According to the plaintiffs,
Talisman joined the venture with full knowledge that
expanding oil production would involve military operations
designed to remove the indigenous population and establish a
"buffer zone."3 20 Talisman knew that these operations were
an integral part of the joint venture and that its partners
routinely coordinated their activities with the Sudanese
military.32 1 For example, the helicopters and bombers used to
attack the population were maintained and operated from
two of the joint venture's airfields.32 2 On November 8, 2001,
the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and named plaintiffs on
behalf of the population of southern Sudan filed suit in the
Southern District of New York." The plaintiffs alleged that
Talisman aided and abetted the government of Sudan in the
commission of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity.324 They subsequently survived several motions to
dismiss.2 In April 2006, however, after completing
discovery, Talisman successfully moved for summary
judgment.3 2 6 According to Presbyterian Church of Sudan,
318. On October 4, 2010, the Court denied certiorari to both of the petitions
discussed in this part of the Article. Since these questions will persist until
they are resolved by the Court, these certiorari briefs are worth examining.
319. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 6, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 78 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Apr. 15, 2010) (No. 09-1262).
320. Id. at 7.
321. Id. at 7-8.
322. Id. at 10.
323. Id. at 10-11.
324. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
251 (2d Cir. 2009).
325. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 319, at 11.
326. Id.
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this was the first time the district court applied "a heightened
mental element in its analysis of Talisman's aiding and
abetting liability."3 27 Presbyterian Church of Sudan appealed
to the Second Circuit. Relying on the Rome Statute, the
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision and held
that the "mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability
in ATS actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone."3 28
On April 15, 2010, Presbyterian Church of Sudan filed a
petition for certiorari asking the Court to decide whether the
Second Circuit misstated the law. 3 29 Presbyterian Church of
Sudan undertook a two pronged strategy. First, it challenged
the Second Circuit ruling that international law governs the
standard for aiding and abetting.330 Next, it posited that even
if international law is the correct source for the standard, the
Second Circuit "fundamentally misconstrued" international
law. 33 1  The first argument for certiorari was shaky; the
second was ironclad.
Presbyterian Church of Sudan made all of the familiar
arguments in favor of applying federal common law principles
for aiding and abetting. As a result, the petition suffered
from all of the problems associated with that approach.3 32
Presbyterian Church of Sudan argued that "international law
itself counsels against looking for substantive international
law complicity norms" but relied for support solely on the
well-known adage that international law "leaves to each
nation the task of defining the remedies that are available for
international law violations."3 33 The brief made no headway
in explaining why courts should treat complicity as an
ancillary question.33 ' Nor did it justify applying federal
common law standards when exercising adjudicatory
jurisdiction.33 5 Worse still, the circuit split alleged by the
plaintiffs does not yet exist. Though there is widespread use
327. Id.
328. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 259.
329. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 319, at 2-3. The petition also
raised a third question concerning conspiracy and joint criminal enterprise
theories of liability. Id. at 5.
330. Id. at 4.
331. Id.
332. See supra Part IV.
333. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 319, at 21-22.
334. Compare id. at 23, with supra notes 239 and 246 and accompanying
text.
335. See supra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
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of the federal common law standard for aiding and abetting
liability among district courts, no other circuit court has
produced binding precedent determining the proper standard
or the body of law from which such a standard is drawn. The
only other court to have grappled with these questions had its
decision vacated by the Ninth Circuit.3 That case was
subsequently settled before the issue could be resolved. The
opinions of Judges Pregerson and Reinhardt in Unocal
therefore lack precedential value. Presbyterian Church of
Sudan would have had to rely entirely on the second
argument in order to obtain a grant of certiorari.3 38 The
Court should have granted certiorari to ensure that federal
courts correctly apply the proper standard for aiding and
abetting as it exists in international law.
In its brief in opposition to certiorari, Talisman accused
Presbyterian Church of Sudan of "advocating a promiscuous
theory of secondary liability" that "attempts to lower Sosa's
bar."33 9 Though it correctly identified the tenuous nature of
the circuit split alleged by the plaintiffs, Talisman otherwise
faltered in its analysis of the law.34 0 Initially, Talisman
attempted to evade the second basis for certiorari by invoking
Supreme Court Rule 10.211 The question before the Court,
however, concerned the Second Circuit's statement of the law,
not its unique application to a certain set of facts. Thereafter,
the brief adopted two main arguments.
First, Talisman defended the Second Circuit's choice of
standard as better entrenched in international law. Relying
on Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
336. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
337. Brief of Talisman Energy Inc. in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 7 n.2, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 78 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Apr. 15,
2010) (No. 09-1262). Talisman also argued that Unocal is irrelevant to this case
because the majority held that the ATS required the application of international
law to the question of aiding and abetting liability. Id. (citing Unocal, 395 F.3d
at 948-49). This argument, however, sidesteps the very important fact that the
Ninth Circuit applied customary international law as the basis for liability
whereas the Second Circuit looked to the Rome Statute.
338. See supra Part IV.B.
339. Brief of Talisman Energy Inc. in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 337, at 2.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 11 (citing SUP. CT. R. 10 ("A petition for a writ of certiorari is
rarely granted when the asserted error consists of . .. the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law.")).
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Justice, the brief argued that the decisions by the ad hoc
tribunals relied on in Unocal are only secondary sources of
law.34 2 It neglected to mention, however, that these tribunals
relied exclusively on the only body of international law
endorsed by Sosa, customary international law. 4 In lieu of
this body of law, the respondents referred to the Rome
Statute and the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Neither source
represents customary international law fully or exclusively.
Nor is private liability barred by either of these instruments.
To recapitulate: the Rome Statute expressly states that
"[n]othing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of
international law for purposes other than this Statute."34 5 As
for the Draft Articles, Article 58 plainly states that the
"articles are without prejudice to any question of the
individual responsibility under international law."346 The
Second Circuit simply misstated the law.
Talisman's second strategy involved a remarkably
expansive interpretation of Sosa's universality requirement.
For example, toward the end of its brief, Talisman argued
that "nowhere do petitioners, or the sources they cite, set
forth the contours of what 'knowledge' means."34 7 Talisman
then speculated about whether the international standard
refers to constructive or actual knowledge and concluded that
"[in the absence of any specific definition, petitioners'
knowledge standard is insufficiently specific to permit a
federal court to create a cause of action in ATS cases. "348In
fact, international courts have applied an encompassing
definition, where it is sufficient to attach liability "if the
342. Id. at 17.
343. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004).
344. Brief of Talisman Energy Inc. in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 337, at 16-17.
345. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 10, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. See also supra notes 255-57.
346. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 58, in Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) at 383,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001). See also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
347. Brief of Talisman Energy Inc. in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 337, at 20.
348. Id.
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perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive."
Unfortunately, this was not an isolated misstatement of the
law by Talisman, but part of a legal strategy designed to cast
doubt on the applicability of international law wherever there
is a wrinkle of complexity. Sometimes, as in this example,
the object of doubt is well-settled international law.
Elsewhere, the targets included matters that have been
traditionally left by international law to domestic courts. At
no point did Talisman identify a rule of international law that
would require clarification in order for the litigation to
proceed.
Underlying this legal strategy is a theory of Sosa that
interprets the requirement of universality to apply to all of
the elements of the trial.35 0 This theory is mistaken. Ever
since they were introduced in Fildrtiga, the requirements of
"clear definition" and "general assent of civilized nations"
have only been applied to the international norm that
provides the cause of action. 5' Like Pfizer, Talisman tried to
graft its own self-serving theory onto footnote twenty:
Naturally, the same rule that governs whether a claim
exists under the ATS also governs how liability should be
measured for such a claim. Again, this Court's ruling in
Sosa was crystal clear. The Court emphasized that its
decision extended to the "related consideration lofi
whether international law extends the scope of liability for
a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being
sued."352
Talisman's confidence about the incontrovertible
meaning of Sosa was unwarranted. Footnote twenty
appeared in a passage on the importance of the clear
definition requirement.5 The majority simply noted that:
349. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1
659 (May 7, 1997).
350. Talisman's grasp of the ATS is illustrated by its reference to the Court's
"narrow brightline rule of decision" in Sosa. Compare Brief of Talisman Energy
Inc. in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 337, at 6, with
Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 724-5 (2004). Scholars have made many claims about
Sosa's clear definition standard but none have claimed that it is a bright-line
rule. See supra notes 43-54.
351. See supra notes 53-54.
352. Brief of Talisman Energy Inc. in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 337, at 6-7 (emphasis added) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at
732 n.20).
353. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
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"[a] related consideration is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor
such as a corporation or individual."5 The Court then
compared the change in consensus between Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic355 and Kadic v. Karadi63 6  with
respect to the question of private liability.5 7 Scholars have
speculated about the effect of this footnote on corporate
liability, but none have suggested that it extended the
requirement of "general assent of civilized nations" to matters
unrelated to the violated norm.3 55
This legal strategy is equally apparent in Talisman's
Conditional Cross-Petition for Certiorari.3 5 9  Talisman
claimed there is "no consensus among States that universal
jurisdiction extends to aiding and abetting the commission of
violations of even those international law norms over which
States are expected to exercise universal criminal
jurisdiction."6 o Sosa does not require such consensus.3 6 1
Even if it did, there exists substantial evidence that the
principle of conditional universal jurisdiction extends to
aiding and abetting.362 The respondent also made much of
the fact that "a 28-country survey carried out on Talisman
Energy's behalf . . . revealed not a single judicial decision
recognizing such liability."36 3 This ignores that the presence
or absence of domestic legal practice does not necessarily give
rise to a rule of customary international law.6'" In any case,
dozens of states have created legal mechanisms capable of
holding corporations liable for violations of international
354. Id. at 732 n.20.
355. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
356. Kadic v. Karadiid, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
357. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20.
358. Talisman's interpretation is surprising because the Conditional Cross-
Petition correctly notes that it concerns clear definition. See Conditional Cross-
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 9, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 78
U.S.L.W. 3463 (Apr. 15, 2010) (No. 09-1418).
359. Id. at 8.
360. Id. at 20.
361. See supra note 177.
362. See supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
363. Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 358, at
14.
364. See supra note 99.
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law.365  Talisman thus misconstrued Sosa to require
universal consensus on all matters of the trial, ignoring that
fundamentally the ATS provides a domestic remedy for the
violation of an international norm.6
Finally, Talisman claimed that applying the knowledge
standard for aiding and abetting would "severely and
inappropriately impact international trade."" Professor
Jack Goldsmith made a similar argument in an amicus brief
submitted on the behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in
Pfizer.16 1 Part VII shows that concern about the harms of
ATS litigation has been vastly exaggerated.369
365. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
366. A small sample will have to suffice. As Jonathan Bush has
demonstrated, charters exist granting an international tribunal jurisdiction
over corporations. Compare supra note 65, with Conditional Cross-Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 358, at 12. Talisman invokes the well-known rule
of international comity that states must cede jurisdiction to those with stronger
claims but neglects to mention that this rule of deference is premised on the
ability and willingness of these states to prosecute the violation of international
law. Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 358, at 17.
The respondent also argues that "universal jurisdiction requires that the
adjudicating State have custody of the accused." Id. at 21. This presumably
refers to the widespread presumption against universal jurisdiction in absentia.
Here, the District Court established personal jurisdiction by piercing the
corporate veil. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No.
01 Civ. 9882 (DLC), 2004 WL 1920978, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004).
Talisman argues that "there is no international consensus equating the concept
of physical custody of a person with personal jurisdiction over a corporation
based on its minimum contacts." Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 358, at 21. No such consensus is necessary.
367. Brief of Talisman Energy Inc. in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 337, at 21.
368. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct.
534 (2009) (No. 09-34), 2009 WVL 2473873.
369. See infra Part VII. Critics charge that the application of international
law to foreign corporations is imperialistic, places corporations with substantial
ties to the U.S. at a disadvantage, and sidesteps the legislature. See Nathan
Koppel, Arcane Law Brings Conflicts from Overseas to U.S. Courts, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 27, 2009), available at httpJ//online.wsj.com/article/SB1251336773
55962497.html; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Rights Case
Gone Wrong: Ruling Imperils Firms and U.S. Diplomacy, WASH. POST
(Apr. 19, 2009), available at http//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/17/AR2009041702859.html. First, calling modern
international law imperialistic is a perversion of the English language.
Imperialism is the failure to consistently apply the rule of law within territory
under one's control, usually to the detriment of the colony or periphery. Legal
imperialism, for example, is the failure to extend constitutional protections
outside the metropole (e.g. Bagram Airbase) or accord indigenous insurgents
their due rights under the laws of war. In contrast, what these critics seem to
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VII. THE PROMISE OF CORPORATE AIDING AND ABETTING
LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS
Judge-made rules are in a sense conditional, that is, they
are subject to legislative or popular revision and hence are
acceptable in a democracy.370
In Sosa, the Court announced that it would "welcome any
congressional guidance in exercising jurisdiction with such
obvious potential to affect foreign relations."7 Six years
later, the legislature remains silent. It is now time for the
Court to step forward and take on the role of common law
adjudicator. Ignoring the problem posed by these emerging
norms is not a viable solution.7
In the years since Fildrtiga, Congress has moved toward
embracing Alien Tort Statute litigation as a form of
accountability. In 1991, Congress passed the Torture Victim
Protections Act which codified "an unambiguous and modem
basis for a cause of action that has been successfully
maintained under an existing law [as in Fildrtiga],3 73 section
1350 of the Judiciary Acts of 1789."374 The drafters praised
be arguing is that applying the basic and universal values which international
law embodies to a handful of intractable dissenters is unjust and intolerable. In
this sense, international law is, like all law, "imperialistic." It embodies
humanity's preference for order and civilization over barbarism. What makes
this sort of "imperialism" tolerable is that the norms in question command the
"general assent of civilized nations." Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
715 (2004); Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d. Cir. 1980). Second,
the United States routinely places corporations at a disadvantage. Third, some
argue that decisions implicating policy tradeoffs should be left to Congress.
Bradley, supra note 7, at 926. However, policy tradeoffs are inherent in all
judicial decisions. Courts play a special role in our system of government when
adjudicating issues of basic human rights because their decisions are principled.
Finally, even under the Revisionist approach to post-Erie federal common law,
Courts should be able to adjudicate these matters because "an interstitial
creation of a cause of action against corporations for violations of the law of
nations would effectuate congressional intent and be consistent with current
federal policy." Vora, supra note 237, at 219.
370. GuiDo CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 92
(1982).
371. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
372. The Court did not grant certiorari in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 78 U.S.L.W. 3463 (Apr. 15, 2010) (No. 09-1262), Pfizer,
Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2009), or Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza,
128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008).
373. The TVPA is interpreted to have codified the common law remedy in
Fildrtiga. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104-105 (2d
Cir. 2000); Kadic v. Karadiid, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995).
374. H.R. Rep. No. 367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1 (1991).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the ATS and noted that "claims based on torture or summary
executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may
appropriately be covered by section 1350. That statute
should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms
that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of
customary international law."37 5  They reiterated that the
Alien Tort Statute "should not be replaced."37 1 Congress has
consistently dismissed attempts to curtail the reach of the
courts in this type of litigation, including Senator Dianne
Feinstein's proposed amendment in 2005 to limit the
application of Alien Tort Statute to suits "asserting a claim of
torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, piracy, slavery, or
slave trading if a defendant is a direct participant acting with
specific intent to commit the alleged tort," which died in
committee." Although Congress has been slow to heed
Sosa's call for "guidance in exercising jurisdiction with such
obvious potential to affect foreign relations,"3 78 it has
consistently acted to maintain the current system of redress.
Meanwhile, with the notable exception of the George W. Bush
administration, the executive branch has supported ATS
litigation by filing amicus briefs under the Jimmy Carter,
Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton
administrations.3 7 9  The current administration has not yet
taken a stand on ATS litigation, but it will likely depart from
the previous administration's position.3 80
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. S. 1874, 109th Cong. § 1350(a) (2005).
378. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004).
379. Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration's Flawed Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV.
HUMAN RTs. J. 169, 169, 174 (2004). Under the Reagan administration the
Justice Department was inconsistent in its approach to the ATS. On one hand
it supported the decision in Fildrtiga. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 19, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.D.C. 1984)
(Nos. 81-1870, 81-1871). On the other hand, it later called for a narrower
reading of ATS jurisdiction. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989) (Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039).
380. President Obama has moved away from the previous administration's
position about when appellate review can be granted in ATS litigation and has
appointed Harold Koh as Legal Advisor to the Department of State. Dean Koh
is a major advocate of ATS litigation who once compared Fildrtiga to Brown v.
Board of Education. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 (1991).
146 [Vol:51
20111 THE FUTURE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 147
A. Local and Global Interests
The United States has an interest in adjudicating
violations of international law in its courts. Not only does
this practice confer legitimacy on the world stage but it also
ensures that the United States government can express its
policy by filing a statement of interest, to which the court will
accord deference.3 s' Indeed, for this very reason, opponents of
ATS litigation may soon become its fiercest champions as
foreign courts increasingly extend liability for human rights
abuses to American corporations. 3 82  Additionally, the Sosa
system may also play an important but underexplored
structural role in our system of government.3
In Sosa, the Court noted that "it would take some
explaining to say now that federal courts must avert their
gaze entirely from any international norm intended to protect
individuals."3 84 As early as 1980, the United States
government concluded that "a refusal to recognize a private
cause of action in these circumstances might seriously
damage the credibility of our nation's commitment to the
381. See Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and
Corporate Responsibility, 56 RuTGERS L. REV. 971, 988 (2004) (noting that the
ATS "plays an important role in preserving the United States' capacity for
global leadership in the defense of human rights"); Robert Knowles, A Realist
Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (noting
that the U.S. government pursues its security and economic interests in ATS
litigation). The extraterritorial application of the ATS has met with general
acquiescence. See supra notes 184-91.
382. See, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of Dec. 22, 2000 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1-23 (EC). The so-called Brussels I
Regulation, "enables jurisdiction within the courts of EU Member States for
cases against corporations registered or domiciled in the EU in respect of
damage sustained in third countries." See also Jan Wouters and Leen Chanet,
Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 NW. J. INT'L
HuM. RTs. 262, 294-300 (2008).
383. The ATS ensures the timely adoption of basic international legal
standards, strengthens our system of participatory adversarialism, and protects
the separation of powers. Though our form of government has continued its
slide into quasi-parliamentarianism, Congress is still notoriously slow in
adopting basic international legal standards into its legislation. The federal
courts play an interstitial role by anticipating long-term changes in our body of
law. The ATS also embodies the strongly embedded principle of private
enforcement. It allows victim participation to an extent that would not be
possible in a system where the government had prosecutorial discretion.
Finally, the ATS owes its legitimacy to the structural independence of our
courts.
384. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004).
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protection of human rights." 8 5  This desire to advance our
nation's commitment to the most basic customs of human
rights law is equally evident on the Supreme Court. In 2001,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor eloquently noted that although
"American judges are becoming more aware of their
responsibilities to respect not only domestic law but also the
law of nations . . . more effort is needed."3 8 1 In Roper v.
Simmons, O'Connor pointed out that "the Court has
consistently referred to foreign and international law as
relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of
decency.""' Justice Anthony Kennedy has emerged as the
most outspoken advocate for strengthening global rule of law
and defending international standards of decency.38 8 More
recently, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg emphasized that "the
U.S. judicial system will be the poorer . . . if we do not both
share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with
values and a commitment to democracy similar to our
own."389 The Alien Tort Statute litigation plays an important
institutional role in protecting the global rule of law and
enforcing customary international law. 9 0
385. Memorandum for the United States, Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).
386. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PRoc. 348 (2002).
387. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604 (2004) (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
388. See Adam Gorlick, Justice Kennedy to Class of '09: Spread Freedom and
the Rule of Law, STAN. REP., (June 14, 2009), available at
http://news.stanford.edulnews/2009/junel7/kennedy-061709.html; Jeffrey
Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law could
change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2005) (citing Kennedy
arguing "there's some underlying common mutual interest, some underlying
common shared idea, some underlying common shared aspiration, [an]
underlying unified concept of what human dignity means").
389. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speech at International Academy of
Comparative Law, American University: "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication, July 30, 2010.
390. Numerous foreign jurists have echoed this conclusion. For example,
Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie recently argued that if
ATS "legislation were replicated in more countries, there would be more
avenues whereby companies could clear their names of allegations made
against them, or complainants could obtain redress, depending on what
the evidence shows." Cristin Schmitz, Binnie Calls for Corporate
Accountability, LAWYERS WKLY. Aug. 29, 2008, available at
http//www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=745. Olivier
Dutheillet de Lamothe of the French Conseil Constitutionnel has similarly
endorsed the ATS. See Curran, supra note 98, at 381.
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B. Robust Structural Safeguards
Concerns about the potential harms stemming from the
Alien Tort Statute ignore the robust structural safeguards of
our federal courts. Plaintiffs must still pass through a
veritable obstacle course of civil procedure that eliminates all
but the most firmly grounded cases.39' Fortunately, the
courts have become increasingly vigilant about the
application of these safeguards. In reviewing the political
question doctrine in Khulumani, the Second Circuit rejected
the notion that
even an appellate court, sitting in review-must dismiss a
case when the executive branch, through a State
Department Statement of Interest or other document,
deems a case to be a political "irritant." This is not so.
Mere executive flat cannot control the disposition of a case
before a federal court. Our principle of separation of
powers not only counsels the judiciary to conduct an
independent inquiry-it requires us to do so. 392
This conclusion has been echoed by the Ninth Circuit,
which held in Sarei v. Rio Tinto that "it is our responsibility
to determine whether a political question is present, rather
than dismiss on that ground simply because the Executive
Branch expresses some hesitancy about a case proceeding."39 3
Even the otherwise controversial decision in Ibrahim v. Titan
Corp.3 9 4 recognized that "an action for damages arising from
the acts of private [militaryl contractors and not seeking
injunctive relief does not involve the courts in 'overseeing the
conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military
391. See generally, K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural
Reasonableness, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 45 (2004) ("[Tihe current structure of
human rights litigation in the United States makes it virtually impossible that
exercising universal jurisdiction in this country will have any detrimental
'collateral consequences' to foreign relations, to foreign policy, or to the
sacrosanct separation of powers.").
392. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 292 (2d Cir. 2007).
393. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 456 F.3d 1969, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
394. 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that "actions of a type
that both violate clear United States policy and have led to recent high profile
court martial proceedings against United States soldiers" are justiciable). The
court erred when it dismissed all claims for failure to allege state action. Id. at
14-15. The plaintiffs should not have been required to show state action
because the universal prohibition on war crimes applies directly to individuals.
See Romero v. Drummond Co. Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1316 (11th Cir. 2008); Kadic
v. Karadi6, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
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power."'3 95
Similar vigilance is discernable with regard to the
application of the state secrets doctrine in an ATS case
involving corporate liability for rendition. In Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., the Ninth Circuit explained that by
"excising secret evidence on an item-by-item basis, rather
than foreclosing litigation altogether at the outset" the
reigning case "recognizes that the Executive's national
security prerogatives are not the only weighty constitutional
values at stake."9 6 The state secrets privilege is not absolute
and "cannot be invoked to prevent a litigant from persuading
a jury of the truth or falsity of an allegation by reference to
non-privileged evidence."39  The Ninth Circuit blasted the
lower court's "sweeping characterization" of the state
privilege and "the government's theory" by which "the
Judiciary should effectively cordon off all secret government
actions from judicial scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its
partners from the demands and limits of the law."" The
state secrets doctrine is not categorical.
The courts have also made advances in their application
of the forum non conveniens and exhaustion requirements.
The judiciary has begun to recognize exhaustion of local
remedies as a necessary prerequisite to ATS standing.9
Significantly, however, the court that mandated this
requirement for all Alien Tort Statute litigation
acknowledged that "courts have avoided the issue by finding
that even if exhaustion were to apply to the [ATS1, local
remedies would in those cases be futile and therefore need not
be exhausted."4 00  As even the D.C. Circuit recently
acknowledged, it's "either this court or nothing."401
395. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 15-16.
396. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009)
(referring to United States v. Reynolds, 341 U.S. 1 (1953)), rev'd en banc 614
F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). On September 8, 2010, a closely-divided en banc
Ninth Circuit reversed this decision in a 6-5 ruling.
397. Id. at 1005.
398. Id. at 1003.
399. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 822 (9th Cir. 2008). But see Jean
v. Dorelien, 431 F 3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting an exhaustion
requirement).
400. Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1214 (citing Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 889-
90 (7th Cir.2005); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 2d 289, 343 n.44 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
401. Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16-17 n.4 (D.D.C. 2005).
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Recalling Judge Calabresi's argument that judge-made
rules "are subject to legislative or popular revision," there
exists one final safeguard to overreaching ATS litigation.4 0 2
If the courts were to ever overstep their mandate, Congress
could always nip the problem in the bud by amending section
1350. Although Congress normally faces significant resource
constraints in mobilizing to overturn decisions, the
countervailing influence of powerful corporate lobbies
eliminates this problem. Yet despite the force of this
influence, Congress has done nothing to extinguish the ATS.
Instead, it has pushed for greater corporate accountability.
For example, Congress debated proposals calling for an even
more stringent regime of global corporate accountability in
the wake of revelations that Yahoo! collaborated with the
Chinese government to catch and imprison dissidents.4 03 One
cannot help but conclude that much of the criticism of the
ATS is overheated and groundless. The promise of the Alien
Tort Statute, on the other hand, is very real.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to illuminate the limits imposed
by customary international law and the Supreme Court's
decision in Sosa on the federal courts regarding corporate
aiding and abetting liability. In mapping out the reach of
these courts, this Article has purposely avoided advancing a
certain vision of the Alien Tort Statute beyond the basic
interstitial theory endorsed by the Supreme Court. The
virtue of this approach is to have defined the realm of the
possible, as it currently exists in law. Corporations may be
held liable under the Alien Tort Statute. Corporate liability
under ATS does not conflict with customary international
law. Federal courts should apply customary international
law when adjudicating alien tort claims against corporations
arising under the aiding and abetting theory of liability. The
402. CALABRESI, supra note 370, at 92.
403. Yahoo Criticized in Case of Jailed Dissident, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 2007,
at C3; Press Release, Representative Christopher H. Smith, House of
Representatives, Smith Reintroduces the Global Online Freedom Act (Jan. 8,
2007) ("American companies should not be working hand-in-glove with
dictators. By blocking access to information and providing secret police with the
technology to monitor dissidents, American IT companies are knowingly-and
willingly-enabling the oppression of millions of people.").
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background principles-"the secret root from which the law
draws all the juices of life"40 4-of customary international law
and ATS jurisprudence suggest that corporate aiding and
abetting liability should exist.
404. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 35.
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